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LAW'S TERRITORY
(A IDSTORY OF JURISDICTION)
Richard T. Ford*
Pop quiz: New York City. The United Kingdom. The East Bay
Area Municipal Utilities District. Kwazulu, South Africa. The Ca
thedral of Notre Dame. The State of California. Vatican City.
Switzerland. The American Embassy in the U.S.S.R. What do the
foregoing items have in common?
Answer: they are, or were, all territorial jurisdictions. A thesis
of this Article is that territorial jurisdictions - the rigidly mapped
territories within which formally defined legal powers are exercised
by formally organized governmental institutions - are relatively
new and intuitively surprising technological developments. New,
because until the development of modern cartography, legal au
thority generally followed relationships of status rather than those
of autochthony.

Today jurisdiction seems inevitable, but, like

death, it is "a habit to which consciousness has not been long
accustomed."1
Surprising? We are now accustomed to territorial jurisdiction ...:.__
so much so that it is hard to imagine that government could be or
ganized any other way. But despite several hundred years of accli
mation, people continue to be disoriented, baffled, and thrilled by
the consequences of jurisdictional legality. We are filled with some
times grudging admiration when the latest Esmeralda evades the
territorial reach of the pursuing constable. Examples abound, both
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. 1988, Stanford; J.D. 1991, Harvard. Ed. I presented earlier versions of this Article and received useful co=ents thereon at: the
Dighton Writers Workshop, sponsored by the Graduate Program of Harvard Law School; the
Howard Rolapp Distinguished VISiting Scholars Lecture Series at the University of Utah
College of Law; The Reach of Law: Law and Humanities at the University of California at
Berkeley, and the American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting in Boston, MA. I
received especially valuable and in-depth co=ents :from Tony Angie, Nick Blomley, Paul
Brest, Dan Danielson, Karen Engle, Barbara Fried, Jerry Frug, Tom Grey, Janet Halley,
Mark Kelman, David Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, Mitch Lasser, Jayne Lee, Michael
McConnell, Illeana Poraas, Peggy Radin and Kendall Thomas. My research assistants,
Madhavi Sunder and Albert Yoon contributed as much in insight as in research legwork. The
staff of the Stanford Law School library was characteristically excellent beyond what any
scholar could expect. Thanks to the staff of the Michigan Law Review for diligent and
thoughtful editing. This project received generous research support funding from Stanford
Law School. Thanks to my 'colleagues for creating the atmosphere in which this. unconven
tional project was encouraged and supported.
1. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FORGET FOUCAULT 23 (1987).
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historical and fictional (or perhaps syncretic). Consider the trek of
the musically gifted von Trapps to the safety of neutral Switzer
land,2 the bootlegger's run of Burt Reynolds's "Bandit" who
stopped just over the county line long enough to thumb his nose at
"Smokey" Sheriff Buford T . Justice,3 the heroic and desperate jour
ney on the fugitive slave's underground railroad, the once heroic,
now demonized, pregnant foreigner who struggles over the border
in time to give birth on American soil and thereby guarantees her
child American citizenship.
This last example illustrates another thesis of this Article. Terri
torial jurisdiction produces political and social identities. Jurisdic
tions define the identity of the people that occupy them. The
jurisdictional boundary does more than separate territory; it also
separates types of people:

native from foreign, urbanites from

country folk, citizen from alien, slave from free.
To some extent, jurisdictional identities are chosen; in some
cases, an individual can move between jurisdictions and thereby
adopt the identity of her new location. Many commentators have
suggested that this type of mobility makes territorially based rela
tions akin to voluntary contracts. The mobile individual "shops"
for a jurisdiction just as a suburban shopper roams the mall looking
for the right Christmas gift.4 But in important ways territorial iden
tities cannot be freely chosen. Even if physical presence alone will
establish membership, one is forced to accept a "bundle" of juris
dictionally linked items. I cannot live in San Francisco while paying
Los Angeles taxes and receiving Los Angeles's package of services,
nor can I pick and choose among the San Francisco services I wish
to receive and pay for. While economic markets generally resist
bundling, the jurisdictional "market" always bundles.
More importantly, many territorial "locations" are simply not
"for sale." One cannot, for instance, become a British subject sim
ply by deciding to move to the United Kingdom. And even within a
nation-state, mobility is limited by legal rules that restrict the avail
ability of housing in certain jurisdictions, often for the explicit pur
pose of controlling in-migration.5 These types of restrictions are
2. See the enchanting, if treacly, THE SoUND OF Music (1\ventieth Century Fox 1965).
3. See that classic of late 1970s low brow decadence, SMOKEY AND THE BANDIT {Univer
sal 1977).
4. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. EcoN.
416 {1956).
5. See, e.g., Ambler Realty v. City of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 {1924) (upholding zoning
ordinance that restricted multi-family housing, writing "[The purpose of the zoning ordi
nance] is to classify the population and segregate them according to their income or situation
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justified as necessary to maintain community character - a ration
ale somewhat at odds with the aspiration that membership in juris
dictions be freely chosen. Hence, territorial identities are in an
important sense remnants of the era before the modern hegemony
of contractual social relations chronicled by Sir Henry Maine.6
Like the social positions of the family, they are largely involuntary
relationships of status.
The word "remnants" is somewhat misleading: it suggests that
these territorial identities are survivors of a bygone era. To the con
trary, this Article will suggest that territorial identities were re
cently invented and grew in importance just as other status
relationships were in decline - in fact, in some instances, territorial
identities displaced other statuses. Territorial identities developed
and matured along with the advance of modern, scientific cartogra
phy. Once cartography made the production of precisely demar
cated legal territories possible, territorial relationships quickly
became dominant. The territorialization of social relations served
important institutional purposes more effectively than did the older
status relationships. Hence the famous historical shift from status
to contract was accompanied by an equally significant shift from
status to locus.
Jurisdictions define both national and sub-national territories.
This Article will primarily deal with sub-national jurisdictions. It is
fairly obvious that the creation of national territories and national
identities has been a major project of national governments. Na
tion building is commonly understood as, in part, the process of na
tional institutions asserting control by destroymg smaller territorial
divisions and affiliations. But the production of sub-national terri
tories and identities has also been an important part of national de
velopment.

The

centralization

of

formal

power

in

national

governments is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of
sub-national territorial divisions. In fact, this Article will argue that
the production of local jurisdictions and local cultures was and is
often a by-product of the centralization of political power. Indeed,
the production of local difference can be an effective strategy for
consolidating and maintaining centralized power. Therefore, this
in life."), overmled by Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding zoning ordinance that prohibited cohabi
tation by three or more persons unrelated by blood or marriage).
6. See generally HENRY SUMNER MAINE, .ANCIENT LAw 165 (Univ . of Ariz. Press 1986)
(1864) ("[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
Status to Contract.").

Michigan Law Review

846

(Vol. 97:843

Article will interrogate and disrupt a facile but misleading opposi
tion between centralization and local autonomy.
Part I of this Article will discuss territorial jurisdiction as a spa
tial structure and as a "governmental technique"7 as then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist once referred to it. It will introduce two opposed
rhetorical descriptions of territorial jurisdiction - organic and syn
thetic - both of which correspond to a distinct type of political
subjectivity.
Part II will present a partial history of territorial jurisdiction,
tracking the emergence and development of legal territories in sev
eral socio-historical contexts. This history calls into doubt the com
mon intuition that territorial jurisdiction is a timeless feature or
foundation of government. Instead, jurisdiction was invented at a
specific historical moment and deployed to advance certain identifi
able projects. Jurisdiction transformed both the way government
operated and, ultimately, the structure of government itself.
Part III will argue that jurisdiction establishes a form of status
identity. Specifically, it will explore in greater detail the territorial
construction of political subjectivity that occurs through jurisdic
tion. It will argue that even seemingly natural or organic territorial
communities are often the products of larger governmental strate
gies that produce a hierarchy of political subjectivities. This gives
us reason for caution when tempted to assert territorial group soli
darity in order to obtain autonomy for minority groups. Too often
the mirage of autonomy hides the bleak reality of social quarantine.
Part IV will argue for a theory of jurisdiction that treats jurisdic
tional arrangements as the architecture of government. It will ar
gue that such a theory of jurisdiction would allow us to see many
contemporary legal conflicts in a new light.
Part V is a short conclusion.

!.
A.

THE BOUNDARIES OF DEMOCRACY

Space Oddity8: A Tale of Two Jurisdictions

I would like to introduce territorial jurisdiction in the context of
a relatively mundane legal dispute.

Holt is a small, largely rural, unincorporated community located on
the northeastern outskirts of Tuscaloosa ...Alabama. Because the
community is within the three-mile police jurisdiction circumscribing
7. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 72 (1978).
8. Apologies to Stanley Kubrick, see 2001: A SPA CE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1968), and David Bowie, see DAVID BoWIE, SPA CE ODDITY (Mercury Records 1969).
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Tuscaloosa's corporate limits, its residents are subject to the city's
"police [and] sanitary regulations." Holt residents are also subject to
the criminal jurisdiction of the city's court, and to the city's power to
license businesses, trades, and professions .. . . [The Holt residents]
claimed that the city's extraterritorial exercise of the police powers
over Holt residents, without a concomitant extension of the franchise
on an equal footing with those residing within the corporate limits,
denies [them] rights secured by the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa presents a seemingly in
tractable problem: what non-tautological justification exists for any
particular limitation of the franchise? A typical answer is that the
geographical limits of the jurisdiction in which the elected body is
authoritative provide a justification. But, as Holt demonstrates, this
simply displaces the problem. Rather than expressing the conflict
in terms of the franchise, one could as easily describe it in terms of
the jurisdictional boundaries. Why, in this instance, should the
boundary of the City of Tuscaloosa not include the residents of the
community of Holt?
The specificity of the jurisdictional question is highlighted in

Holt precisely because there is little else at stake. Although the
community of Holt is "governed" by Tuscaloosan institutions, it
seems that few of these institutions make controversial substantive
decisions. Local courts and police enforce

state law while sanitary

and business regulations are relatively technical in nature and are
not generally a source of political conflict. Thus, rather than focus
ing on a substantive harm,
community.

Holt centers on the definition of political

Holt raises a vexing problem for normative democratic

theory, akin to the dilemma of forced annexation and minority se
cession: taking the principle of majority rule as a given, how are we
to define the limits of the community within which a majority will
rule?
At first glance there would seem to be only two possibilities:
the relevant political community either includes the residents of
Holt as well as those of Tuscaloosa, or it only includes the residents
of Tuscaloosa.
There are in fact three possible answers.

·

Answer One: The political community is the police jurisdiction
of Tuscaloosa, including Holt. The exercise of even limited police
power over the residents of Holt is determinative - those subject
to a direct exercise of the police power must be enfranchised to

9. Holt, 439 U.S. at 61-63 (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
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control that power. This answer is appealing. After all, what legiti
mate reason could Tuscaloosa have for excluding the residents of
Holt from the political process? The risk that the residents of Holt
may, on average, hold different views from those of Tuscaloosa and
therefore alter the outcomes of political contests does not seem to

be a legitimate reason for excluding them. The democratic process
is designed to resolve differences between people of different views.

But on reflection it is not clear that disagreement is always a bad
reason to exclude a group from a political community. A primary
reason for multiple and distinct territorial jurisdictions is inescap
ably to separate distinctive groups of people with distinctive views
and desires. Why have several European nation-states as opposed
to a United States of Europe? Ask any British gent, German frau

lein or French

mademoiselle and you'll likely be told: "Because we

are so different, each nation. Our way of life would be destroyed if
we constantly had to compromise with foreigners." Why do we in
sist on maintaining fifty separate state governments, with their in
consistent and cumbersome state laws, state bureaucracies, flags,
license plates, mottoes and state birds? An important reason is that
many Americans think that the states have separate characters
worth preserving and that the citizens of each state are different
from those of the others and should, at least for certain purposes,
be able to act based only on the views of insiders. Why do we have
separate local governments, defining city and suburb, rich and poor,
racial and religious communities? Again, many people think that
these jurisdictions define political groups or communities that have
some moral weight. If territorial groups do have moral weight,
sometimes we must restrict the franchise to such a select group.
In fact, the word "sometimes" is misplaced. We

always restrict

the franchise to a select group; the question is how such a group is
defined. The institution of jurisdiction is one significant mechanism
for defining the boundaries of the political community and hence
the limits of the franchise.

Answer Two: The political community is the corporate jurisdic
tion of the City of Tuscaloosa (excluding Holt). Tuscaloosa's exer
cise of control over residents of unincorporated Holt is immaterial.
As the majority opinion points out, any "city's decisions inescap
ably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders. . ..
Yet no one would suggest that nonresidents . .. have a constitu-

February
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tional right to participate in the political processes bringing [them]

about."10

One might object that Holt residents are directly affected by
Tuscaloosa's regulations. But this does not distinguish those living
in Holt from a host of other non Tuscaloosans who may own prop
erty in Tuscaloosa or enter Tuscaloosa to work, shop, visit friends,
etc. They too are subject to Tuscaloosa's police power. They may
pay Tuscaloosa's property taxes and be subject to its land use plan
ning; drive through Tuscaloosa streets, subject to arrest by its police
officers; patronize Tuscaloosa's business and indirectly pay its busi
ness taxes and benefit from and bear the costs of its regulations;
and yet they are denied the right to influence its government
through the ballot box. Local decisions affect outsiders because
people trade and socialize across jurisdictional lines. "But ... the
fact that people trade with one another rather extensively does not
mean that they care to be brought together in a more solemn asso
ciation, as citizens in a common polity. Nor does it suggest that it
would be good for them to be joined in that way."11
Perhaps the Court could have held that local autonomy, the
constitutional·recognition of a solemn political union, justified the
jurisdictional arrangement at issue in Holt. But there is no constitu
tional principle of local autonomy. For constitutional purposes, lo
cal governments are not solemn political associations but rather
subdivisions of state government. No constitutionally recognized
value protected the integrity of Tuscaloosa's boundaries. The state
could expand the corporate jurisdiction to include the citizens of
Holt or reduce the police jurisdiction to coincide with the corporate
jurisdiction with or without the consent of the government or the
people of Tuscaloosa.
This brings us to the improbable but dispositive .. .

Answer Three: The political community is neither the corpo
rate, nor the police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa, but rather the juris
diction of the state ·of Alabama. The Holt majority ultimately
concludes: "[T]his Court does not sit to determine whether Ala
bama has chosen the soundest or most practical form of internal
10. Holt, 439 U.S. at 69.
11. HADLEY ARKEs, THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE CITY 325 (1981).

Of course the residents
of Holt do more than trade with Tuscaloosa; they are actually governed by Tuscaloosa in
their place of residence. But to assert that residence is the distinguishing characteristic is
tautological. It only follows that the residents of Holt are also residents of the political com
munity of Tuscaloosa if one already accepts the premise that the political community must
include anyone subject to the governmental power in their place of residence. But this is
precisely what is at issue in the case.
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government possible. Authority to make those judgments resides in
the state legislature, and Alabama citizens are free to urge their
proposals to that body."12
Note the dual move. First, the Holt Court describes the local
jurisdiction not in terms of political community or local solidarity,
but instead as a "form of internal government,"13 "[a] convenient
agenc[y] for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State
as may be entrusted to [it]."14 Local government boundaries are
simply another �et of state laws, subject to the state political pro
cess. Second, it then follows that the only relevant political process
occurs at the statewide level. All Alabama citizens, Holt residents
and Tuscaloosans alike, are equally entitled to vote in Alabama
elections and can "urge their proposals"15 to change the local juris
dictional arrangement at that level of government. If the Holt resi
dents lose in the statewide political process, too bad; they have no
constitutional claim to a different outcome.
The right to vote - which state government could not deny its
citizens absent a compelling justification - simply does not apply
to Holt residents who wish to vote in Tuscaloosa's elections. It is
well understood that a bona fide residency requirement for exercise
of the franchise in a territorial jurisdiction is a constitutionally per
missible limitation on the right to vote.16 The desire to limit the
vote to residents of the jurisdiction is, ipso facto, a compelling justi
fication; the state need not offer a compelling justification, or in
deed any justification, for the location of any particular set of
boundaries.
But how, one may ask, can limiting the vote to residents be a
compelling justification for abridging a fundamental - perhaps the
most fundamental - constitutional right when the criteria for the
limitation (the location of the boundaries that define residence in
the jurisdiction) are never justified? The court does not address
this question.
Nor could it. The boundaries that define territorial jurisdictions
are a legal paradox because they are both absolutely compelling
and hopelessly arbitrary. In one sense, all jurisdictional boundaries
are arbitrary: that separating France from Germany or the United
12. Holt, 439 U.S. at 73-74 (emphasis added).
13. Holt, 439 U.S. at 74.
14. Holt, 439 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
15. Holt, 439 U.S. at 74.
16. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621
(1904).
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States from Canada as much so as that separating Holt from Tusca
loosa. Yet, at the same time, an unwavering faith in the necessity
and legitimacy of those boundaries would seem to be· not only a
foundation of our government, but a precondition of any govern
ment. Our reaction to the formality of jurisdictional arrangements
is not that snide condescension or righteous outrage that we direct
at malleable human institutions (the IRS for example, or the
United Nations) but rather something akin to the reverence and
awe we reserve for natural phenomena beyond our control or com
prehension. When the von Trapps reach Switzerland, only the sim
plest child dares to ask, "Why don't the Nazis just cross the border
to get them?" It is simply understood by those with a jurisdictional
frame of mind (and how quickly we develop it, tutored by such
compelling stories!) that they can't cross the line, that if they do
their authority will vanish like Cinderella's carriage at the stroke of
midnight. The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction question it and all that is solid melts into air.

Holt is instructive because embedded within this rather pedes
trian conflict are the discursive elements that are common to many,
perhaps all, jurisdictional conflicts. We will see these arguments
many times again as we explore the history of jurisdiction. On the
one hand we have a conception, advanced by the Holt dissent, of
jurisdiction as a self-validating and foundational unit of govern
ment, the political community that is premised on the "reciprocal
relationship between the process of government and those who sub
ject themselves to that process by choosing to live within the area of
its authoritative application."17 Although the Holt majority rejects
this conception of jurisdiction for local government, it tacitly em
ploys it for the political process of the state government. On the
other hand we have a diametrically opposed conception, advanced
by the Holt majority in its description of Tuscaloosa, of jurisdiction
as a "governmental technique,"18 a simple policy tool no different
than any other agency created by law and vindicated by the political
process.
Both of these common understandings of jurisdictional subdivi
sions foreclose any consideration of territorial jurisdiction itself as a
governmental institution. The jurisdiction is either an arm of the
state, of no particular interest except as a matter of narrow adminis
trative technique (is it "efficient"?), or it is an organic political com17. Holt, 439 U.S. at 82 (Brennan,
18. Holt, 439

U.S.

J.,

dissenting).

at 72 (describing the extraterritorial exercise of municipal power).
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Holt is

disquieting because it upsets these easy ideological descriptions;19
the hybrid Tuscaloosa police jurisdiction, this dangerous jurisdic
tional supplement, foregrounds the significance of jurisdictions for
democratic ideals.02
B.

Mapping Jurisdiction

For our purposes, several characteristics define the modern ter
ritorial jurisdiction. These characteristics are not typical, but proto
typical. This definition will necessarily be extreme as compared to
actual jurisdictions in practice.
(1) A territorial jurisdiction categorizes the elements over which
authority is to be exercised primarily by area, and secondarily, if at
all, by type. It may also refer to several specific types of things, or
be defined much more broadly. It will always, however, be defined
by area. An entity could, in theory, have authority over "all oil,
wherever it is found." Such an entity would not be a jurisdiction
but an authority of another kind.

A jurisdiction is territorially

defined.

(2) It is definitely bounded. The boundaries are not ambiguous
or contested except in anomalous cases or in times of crisis or tran
sition. If ambiguity arises, it is usually a source of concern and em
barrassment and is settled as quickly as possible. The geographic
19. Holt may seem aberrational, but it does not deal with an aberrational form of govern
ment. At the time of the decision, 35 states allowed municipal governments to exercise extra
territorial jurisdiction. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 72.
20. This opposition between jurisdiction as foundational and jurisdiction as "mere tech
nique" is closely related to the distinction that the Holt opinion makes between those juris
dictions that are thought inherently to possess sovereignty and those jurisdictions that are
thought only to exercise power derived from a greater sovereign entity. In Holt, the majority
opinion is premised on the established legal principle that local governments do not exercise
independent power but only the power that state governments allow them to exercise. This is
the necessary implication of the majority's suggestion that disgruntled Alabamans may "urge
their proposals" to limit Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial jurisdiction to the state legislature. See
Holt, 439 U.S. at 74.
For the most part, this Article will focus on jurisdictions that are formally subordinate to
larger sovereigns. But we must not overstate the distinction. A sharp distinction between
sovereign and subordinate jurisdictions is overly formalistic and misleading. For instance, we
may intuitively believe that nation-states are sovereign jurisdictions while the subdivisions of
the nation-states are subordinate. But in those nations, like the United States, where repre
sentation in federal government is determined by jurisdictional subdivisions, one could assert
that the combination of subdivisions is sovereign. It is often difficult to determine whether a
sovereign jurisdiction chronologically or normatively precedes its jurisdictional subdivisions,
or whether it is simply the sum of its subdivisions.
Further, many "subordinate" jurisdictions are explicitly modeled as minor sovereigns
rather than as instruments of larger jurisdictions. For example, despite their formally
subordinate status, a common conception of American local governments is that of "impe
rium in imperio": a sovereignty within a sovereign.
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boundaries of a jurisdiction are a "bright line" rule, never a flexible
standard.
is abstractly and homogeneously conceived. Rather than
defining the relevant territory according to concrete factors such as
population, resources or other elements susceptible to narrative ex

(3) It

plication, jurisdiction refers to an abstract area. By abstract I mean
simply that the space of a jurisdiction is conceived of independently
of any specific attribute of that space. Alabama law does not give
Tuscaloosa police jurisdiction over Holt specifically. Instead it gives
Tuscaloosa jurisdiction over everything within three miles of its cor
porate borders; the specifics are not enumerated.21
This empty space is a conception that is facilitated, if not made
possible, by the modem, areal map.22 The map is the primary rep
resentation of abstract space. A typical map of New York City's
five boroughs shows us little of significance about life in the Big
Apple, but it definitively establishes the areal limits of each bor
ough. Of course, other representations of abstract space are possi
ble, but most refer to maps, such as the notation in a treaty between
nations that refers to a cartographic grid of latitude and longitude,
or the language in a property title that refers to an official chart of
plots.
(a) One consequence of this abstract presentation of space is
that it eliminates the need for the specific enumeration and classifica
tion by kind. 23 When novel or unpredictable circumstances arise,
we do not suffer "gaps" or "conflicts" of authority while decision
makers decide who is in control. One need not ask whether the
municipal government of New York City has authority over immi21. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 61 n.1. Alabama's extraterritorial jurisdiction statute reads, in
.
relevant part:
The police jurisdiction in cities having 6,000 or more inhabitants shall cover all adjoining
territory within three miles of the corporate limits, and in cities having less than 6,000
inhabitants and in towns, such police jurisdiction shall extend also to the adjoining terri
tory within a mile and a half of the corporate limits of such city or town.
Ordinances of a city or town enforcing police or sanitary regulations and prescribing
fines and penalties for violations thereof shall have force and effect in the limits of the
city or town and in the police jurisdiction thereof and on any property or rights-of-way
belonging to the city or town.
Holt, 439 U.S. at 61 n.1.
22. Contrast the concrete, lived space of a physically bounded structure, such as a build
ing or walled city. There, the space defined by walls is physically transformed, it is exper
ienced as a distinct place. In most cases, specific attributes of the space account for the
decision to place it within the physical barrier. A mapped space, by contrast, can be defined
before any settlement has taken place, indeed ,before the territory in question has even been
visited by the cartographer. A mapped space may offer no clue as to its boundaries. It is
experienced not in person, but only through the map.

23. See ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: hs THEORY AND HISTORY 32
(1986).
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grants who arrive in its territory because it has authority over all
people within the jurisdiction. We need not ask whether the state
of Texas may tax or regulate newly discovered oil deposits within
the territory of Texas, because it has the authority to tax and regu
late all land uses within its jurisdiction.
(b) A close corollary of the above is that jurisdictional space
may serve to obscure social relations and the distribution of re
sources. General purpose jurisdictions such as municipal govern
ments, counties, states and nation-states govern such a wide range
of activities that it is impossible to list them all, much less uncover
the reasons for their control by a particular governmental institu
tion. Similarly, even limited or single-purpose jurisdictions are es
tablished with multiple purposes - electoral districts are drawn to
facilitate or thwart certain political parties, social groups, geo
graphic interests, etc. - that are never enumerated and are impos
sible to uncover.
(c) Another aspect of abstraction is that jurisdiction tends to

present social and political relationships as impersonal. 42 Rather
than define authority according to status relationships such as caste,
race, religion or title, jurisdiction seems to level and equalize social
relations, at least within the jurisdictional space. Everyone who
buys something in the jurisdiction of New York City pays city sales
taxes, not only "peasants" or Protestants or "people who voted for
Ruth Messenger." As we shall see, this impersonal leveling is often
more illusory than real. Nevertheless, it is a significant ambition of
jurisdiction

to

render

political

relationships

impersonal

and

objective.
( d) Finally, jurisdictional space is

conceptually empty.

Although any number of specific things and social relationships wildlife habitats, informal communities, Native American settle
ments - may be present in, and even in part defined by, the space
in question, jurisdiction tends to reduce space to an empty vessel
for governmental power.
(4) Jurisdictional divisions tend to produce "gapless" maps of
contiguous political territories. The modem world is divided into
jurisdictions. Gaps or zones of unclaimed or ambiguously appor
tioned territory are anomalous.

24. See

id. at 33.
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a Social Practice

It is tempting to examine jurisdiction solely in terms of its mate
rial/spatial attributes, as if it were simply an object or a built struc
ture. But jurisdiction is also a discourse, a way of speaking and
understanding the social world. Much of what is fascinating and
vexing about territorial jurisdiction is that it is simultaneously a ma
terial technology, a built environment and a discursive intervention.
These elements cannot be neatly severed. Further, no one level is
foundational and the others epiphenomena!. Instead, all three
levels are equally essential. To properly understand jurisdiction we
must reject the way of thinking that neatly severs fact from repre
sentation or "the material" from "the discursive."
1.

Jurisdiction

as

a Bundle of Practices

[Mapping] became a lethal instrument to concretize the projected de
sire on the earth's surface. ... Communication theory and common
sense alike persuade us that a map is a scientific abstraction of reality.
A map merely represents something which already exists objectively.
[But at times] this relationship was reversed. A map anticipated a
spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for,
rather than a model of, what it purported to represent.25
Perhaps it is best to think of territorial jurisdiction as a set of
social practices, a code of etiquette. Social practices must be
learned and communicated to others. They exist in the realm of
discourse, they are representations of approved behavior as well as
the behavior itself. For example, the social practice called "the
Tango" is a combination of the diagram that "maps" the steps and
the actual movement of individuals in rhythm (hopefully) and to
music: "When dancing the tango, the man leads and the lady fol
lows, each partner should move according to the diagram." These
representations have material consequences; they determine who
leads and who follows as well as where one places one's feet. It is
both an actual spatial practice and the graphical representation of
that practice. One could learn to dance the Tango just by watching
people actually dance, but the diagrams standardize the learning
process and thereby in a real sense define the dance itself. Note
that it would be absurd to describe dance notation as "ideology" or
"legitimation" as if it misled us as to the nature of the practice. Yet
it would also be incomplete to think of it as an innocent description,
25. THONGCHAI WINICHAKUL, SIAM MAPPED: A HISTORY OF
NATION 129-30 (1994).

TiiE

GEO-BODY OF A

Michigan Law Review

856

[Vol. 97:843

as if the graphical representation only describes and has nothing to
do with perpetuating and regulating the "actual practice."
Similarly, jurisdiction is a function of its graphical and verbal
descriptions; it is a set of practices that are performed by individuals
and groups who learn to "dance the jurisdiction" by reading de
scriptions of jurisdictions and by looking at maps. This does not
mean that jurisdiction is "mere ideology," that the lines between
various nations, cities and districts "aren't real." Of course the lines
are real, but they are real because they are constantly being made
real, by county assessors levying property taxes, by police pounding
the beat (and stopping at the city limits), by registrars of voters
checking identification for proof of residence. Without these prac
tices the lines would not "be real" - the lines don't preexist the
practices.
Of course each of these practices can be described as "respond
ing" to the lines or working within the lines rather than making
them. When we think of the practices as happening "within the
lines" and imagine that the boundary lines exist independently of
the practices that give them significance, we think of jurisdiction in
the abstract, removed from any particular social content. We imag
ine that jurisdiction is the space drawn on a map, rather than a col
lection of rules that can be represented graphically as a map.
For many purposes, this way of thinking about jurisdiction is
perfectly reasonable; sometimes everyone understands the jurisdic
tional dance and knows where to step. At these times the map does
seem to precede the practices. Indeed, the representation of juris
dictional space may at times precede the actual practices that give a
jurisdiction life and meaning. Nevertheless, we must not treat juris
diction as a thiµg that precedes practice. Lines on a map may antic
ipate a jurisdiction, but a jurisdiction itself consists of the practices
that make the abstract space depicted on a map significant. More
over, when the stakes of a jurisdiction are in question, as they were
in Holt, one cannot simply refer to lines on a map. In order to
understand the significance of jurisdiction as an institution, we must
constantly remind ourselves that jurisdiction is itself a set of prac

tices, not a preexisting thing in which practices occur or to which
practices relate.

2.

The Forbidden Dance: Jurisdiction as Production of
Status Identity

The Tango, like many dances, establishes quite specific roles for
the individual dancers. There is a male and a female role, quite
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assertively marked by costume (suits for the gents,' glamorous and
often aggressively sexy dresses for the ladies) as well as by the re
quirements of the dance steps. The male "leads" and the female
"follows." There is a set of prescribed actions that rely on the as
sumed superior physical strength of the person occupying the male
position and the assumed diminutive size and gracefulness of the
person occupying the female position. These positions can be seen
as simple reflections of a preexisting reality. There is a distinction
between men and women based in biological nature which corre
sponds to a number of characteristics such as strength, size, asser
tiveness and gracefulness.

The dance just reflects these facts.

Because men are more assertive they lead while the more submis
sive women follow.
But this way of thinking too easily assumes a relationship of
cause and effect.

It may be, on the contrary, that

hundreds of social

practices, of which the Tango is one, construct these gendered roles
and encourage people to conform to them. A physically strong, tall
and assertive woman will not be offered the "male" position, even if
she is naturally well suited for it. She will be encouraged by dance
instructors, parents, potential partners and friends to conform to
the female role: learn to accept the guidance of the male, develop
grace at the expense of strength.
Notice that it may become very difficult to distinguish between
"coerced" and "voluntary" conformity to the status roles.

Our

strong and assertive woman will find it easier to 'conform to the
female role than to attack the Tango's structure. No one need force
her in the sense of establishing formal punishment for assertive
women. Instead, the

status quo effectively sanctions her assertive

ness by depriving her of acceptable roles in which she can be asser
tive. Her friends will sanction her by telling her that she could get a
date easily if she were a bit "nicer" or "more feminine." Men will
silently punish her by refusing to ask her to dance. If she wants to
dance, she will conform. Over time conformity will become "sec
ond nature." Our now accomplished dancer will remember her as
sertive past as an "awkward phase" that she grew out of, as a
butterfly emerges from a cocoon. At that point the status will have
also become her identity.
To some extent, the dance is a highly stylized context in which
gender identity and gender status is performed. The Tango teaches
us that men and women have different statuses because they have
different natures.

It builds a status and simultaneously justifies that

status as a biological or natural fact. It provides its own evidenti:µ-y
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justification: men and women in fact behave differently while danc
ing; they demonstrate by their own actions that the premise of the
gendered dance is accurate.26
Similarly, jurisdiction constructs legal statuses. The meaning of
Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction is that some citizens have the status
of "voting resident" while others have the status of "nonvoting per
son subject to regulation in their place of residence" (perhaps the
choreographic analogy would be "dancer" versus "wallflower"). It
is also true that jurisdiction constructs statuses or identities based
on the type of jurisdiction with which one is associated: one's juris
dictional position is analogous to the gendered positions in the cho
reographed dance.

When we perform these jurisdictional roles

often enough they too become "second nature."27 But this type of
"second nature" is the product of social practices that are enforced

by social custom and, more importantly, by law.2s
D.

The Sacred and the Profane: Speaking Jurisdiction

What follows in this section is a description of a discourse or a

set of understandings about jurisdictions. In legal and political dis
course, jurisdictions are described through a dialogical opposition:
they are either organic/authentic or synthetic/convenient. This de
scriptive opposition is a central part of the jurisdictional perform
ance, just as the opposed male and female roles are indispensable to
the performance of the Tango. The opposition informs our thinking
about a given jurisdiction at a given moment. But the description
does not necessarily define any given jurisdiction in a permanent
sense. Nor is it an innocent description of a preexisting reality. In
stead, the same jurisdiction may be understood as "organic" in one
context and "synthetic" in another. For instance, the city of Tusca26. I owe this line of analysis regarding gender to Judith Butler. See generally Juo1n1
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990). Note that it is not necessary to deny the existence of
biological differences between the sexes in order to question the thoughtless conflation of
these biological differences witlx a host of social differences.
27. Consider tlxe plaintiffs in Holt: tlxeir objection was not to the substance of any partic
ular regulation that the city of Tuscaloosa imposed, but rather to the mere fact of being
subject to Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial regulation. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 62. If the state of
Alabama had subjected the co=unity of Holt to identical regulations we would most likely
react witlx indifference, although tlxe effect on Holt residents would be almost identical. In
botlx cases, the option available to Holt residents who wished to change the regulations
would be the same: attempt to lobby the state legislature.
28. In no way do I wish to suggest that because it produces statuses, jurisdiction - much
less tlxe Tango! - should be abolished. Nor is the answer to replace structured practices with
fluid ones that allow individuals autonomy - all dance must be modem interpretive dance!
Down witlx choreography! At this point, I simply wish to draw attention to an aspect of
territorial jurisdiction that has been overlooked and to suggest that this aspect is not acciden
tal, but instead a central and indispensable function of the jurisdiction.
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loosa was thought of as an "organic" political community by the
dissenting justices, and as a "synthetic" governmental technique by
the majority. This section will focus, not on the truth or falsity of
either description of jurisdiction, but instead on the terms of the
debate.29
1.

Organic Jurisdictions

Organic jurisdictions are the natural outgrowth of circum
stances, conditions and principles that, morally, preexist the state.
They are, in Durkheim's terms, Gemeinshaft communities.30 They
are defined socially rather than metrically, concretely rather than
abstractly. The space of an organic jurisdiction is personal, authen
tic, encumbered, sacred. An organic jurisdiction is legitimated by
its pedigree.
For example, a local government may be understood as a natu
ral outgrowth of a social and economic community - a town or
agricultural collective - that preexists state intervention and would
exist with or without such intervention. An organic community
may be united primarily by economy or by culture. For example,
certain jurisdictions may be thought to be the outgrowth of certain
geographically-based economic interests - trading or manufactur
ing, maritime or landlocked, cotton producing or wheat harvesting
- while others may be thought to reflect the cultural particularities
of their inhabitants. Many of course, combine both economic and
cultural foundations. The Amish of Pennsylvania, for instance, are
distinct in both economic and cultural dimensions.
The ideological foundation of nation-states is primarily that of
organicism; nations are thought to represent "a people" who are
both distinctive and relatively homogeneous. The French are
united not only by language but by something called "culture": a
set of practices, significant artifacts, beliefs, styles, a certain je ne
sais quoi.
29. Hence this Article will employ the terms "organic (or synthetic) conception" and "or
ganic (or synthetic) description" interchangeably to mean the mode of discourse that
presents the given jurisdiction as organic (or synthetic). Further, the terms "organic jurisdic
tion" and "synthetic jurisdiction" refer, not to the essence of the jurisdiction in question, but
instead to the way that it is understood and perceived. This perception will, of course, affect
the material nature of the jurisdiction and the nature of the social relations of its inhabitants.
The term "organic (or synthetic) jurisdiction" is meant to refer to such effects as well as to
the rhetorical representation of the jurisdiction, but it is not meant to assert a core ontologi
cal status.
30. See FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY & SocIETY 12-14, 277 n.27 (Charles P.
Loomis ed. & trans., 1957).
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Organic jurisdictions appear as matters of right and are de
fended against attack in terms of autonomy, self-determination and
cultural preservation. Organic jurisdictions are understood as both
natural facts and as the outgrowth of principles. The combination
of the two serve to imbue jurisdictions with an air of the inevitable.
For instance, it is assumed to be a relatively prepolitical fact that
there exists a French culture or a lifestyle of the American South.
Liberal societies cherish the principle that social groups should be
allowed to exist and flourish, free of governmental interference.
The conclusion seems inevitable: the jurisdictions that "house" and
protect such social groups are natural and must be respected and
preserved.
Moreover, the organic conception posits an organic relationship
between such groups and the territory they occupy. It is not simply
that the groups themselves are of primary importance, but also that
the groups' identities depend on their control over a particular ter
ritory, a significant and culturally encumbered place. It follows that
nonjurisdictional means of providing such a group with power and
security will not suffice. Indeed, in the most extreme examples,
even a substitute territory will not do - the land and the people
are one. Imagine, for instance, the reaction of the Mormons if
asked to move en mass from Salt Lake City to another city where
they would enjoy comparable power, or consider the relationship of
Palestinians and Israelis to Jerusalem.
In terms of political representation the organic jurisdiction has
moral weight independent of its citizens.

It is not simply a

container of citizens. For example, the American states are equally
represented in the Senate, regardless of their population: as a for
mal matter Alaska is the equal of California. An organic territory
is thought to define a cohesive entity with united and unique
interests.

2. Synthetic Jurisdictions
Synthetic jurisdictions, by contrast, are created by some institu
tion in order to serve its purposes. They do not define a prepolitical
social group, but are instead imposed on groups of people from
"outside" or "above." In one sense, the group defined by the syn
thetic jurisdiction is itself created by government. If such groups
have a "culture" at all, it is an institutional culture, a culture of
bureaucracy perhaps. Rather than reflecting authenticity, synthetic
jurisdictions exist for the sake of convenience.

In Durkheim's
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Gesellschaft communities.31 A government may

create a jurisdiction in order to facilitate enforcing the law, collect
ing taxes, gathering statistical data or providing services. Synthetic
jurisdictions may have some degree of formal autonomy to make
decisions and alter arrangements, but such autonomy is granted
only in order to advance a goal of the central government, such as
responsiveness to changing circumstances or efficiency.
Synthetic jurisdictions exist for the convenience of the institu
tions that they serve. There is no independent reason for their
existence; hence no one speaks of rights when and if they are al
tered or eliminated. Nor can one object to them on the basis of
rights. One may have a rights-based claim against the governmen
tal institution that created or altered the jurisdiction, but such a
claim would take the form of an attack on the policy or procedure
by which subdivisions are created, not an attack on the existence or
shape of a particular jurisdiction

qua jurisdiction. (For instance,

one might attack redistricting because it is racially discriminatory
but could not assert a right to any particular district.)
The synthetic jurisdiction assumes that the individual is the pri
mary agent in political life and that territory serves strictly instru
mental purposes. Synthetic territory is fungible. Its occupants are
mobile and rootless; they are rational profit maximizers and techno
cratic modern citizens. The group defined by the synthetic jurisdic
tion has no moral relevance; it is the lonely crowd.32
The electoral district is perhaps the epitome of the synthetic ju
risdiction.

A

synthetic jurisdiction is represented as a territorial

container of individuals. Hence, electoral districts must be periodi
cally reapportioned to conform to the equipopulosity requirement.
Such reapportioning serves political equality because the morally
significant entity is the individual and not the jurisdiction. Not only
is it necessary that every citizen's vote be equally weighted, but al
tering the jurisdiction without her consent is not problematic - cit
izens understand that the synthetic jurisdiction is the servant of the
state; it is a medium for the administration of the franchise and
nothing more.

3.

Thinking Jurisdictionally

The opposed representations of territorial jurisdiction - "or
ganic" and "synthetic" - are employed by various actors as argu-

31. See id.
32. See DAVID RIEsMAN, THE LoNELY CRowo: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING .AMERICAN
CHARACTER (1950).
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ments for or against a given controversial action. For instance, a
jurisdiction may be described as synthetic by someone who wishes
to change the jurisdiction against the wishes of affected parties,
while the same jurisdiction may be described as "organic" by those
who wish to assert "rights" to the jurisdiction.
The dialogical opposition serves other purposes as well. The
two poles of the opposition each correspond to a type of political
identity. The deployment of the organic jurisdiction corresponds
with the production of the local. The creation of a jurisdiction that
is understood to be "organic" defines a local community that will
appear to be distinctive both in itself and in its relationship to the
territory that defines it. By deploying the organic description, gov
ernment and other bureaucracies can plausibly define the group oc
cupying the jurisdiction as a prepolitical social fact, as authentic,
spontaneous and uncontaminated by government in its composition
and culture. The rhetorical power of the organic mode encourages
any group that wishes to establish a jurisdiction to present itself as
an "organic" social group with distinctive cultural norms and values
that demand the protection and autonomy that a jurisdiction pro
vides. The organic jurisdiction safeguards tradition and legacy.
The deployment of the synthetic description corresponds with
the regularization of the body politic. By this I mean that the crea
tion of an avowedly synthetic jurisdiction encourages citizens to un
derstand themselves as rational and objective utility maximizers
and to conform to a set of activities that facilitate the free alienabil
ity of land, individual freedom of action, and geographic and social
mobility. The synthetic mode tends to devalue claims of incom
mensurability and uniqueness in favor of fungibility and market ex
change. Social relations are seen as rationally administered through
bureaucratic policy and arms length bargains: people can be "made
whole" for the disruption of settled social expectations, either by
alternative arrangements of equal value, by offsetting benefits of
mobility or by cash payments. Those inhabiting the synthetic juris
diction sacrifice the security that autonomy might provide in favor
of the freedom of action facilitated by socio-spatial arrangements
that can change easily to meet new circumstances. The synthetic
jurisdiction is justified by its instrumental convenience. It stands
for progress and efficiency.
At this point I must emphasize that the opposition described
above is a conceptual distinction between jurisdictions. The opposi
tion exists in the realm of rhetoric and discourse. It guides our per
ceptions and our actions, and may be more or less accurate as a
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way of describing the world. More importantly, .its usefulness may
depend less on its descriptive accuracy and more on its effectiveness
as an epistemological filter. The dyad may not describe what we
experience. Rather, it may influence how we think about what we
experience.
There are several tempting but incorrect ways of understanding
the function of this opposition. Most obviously, one may conclude
that the opposition is simply an accurate reflection of reality: juris
dictions are in fact either organic or synthetic, just as people are in
fact either male or female. This approach must be rejected not be
cause there is "no such thing" as an organic or a synthetic jurisdic
tion, but because there are too many ambiguous cases to allow for
such a sharp bi-polar division. Taking the opposition on its own
terms, few jurisdictions actually conform to the prototypical de
scriptions - most are a hybrid of the two. Yet in practice we tend
to force the actual, messy, ambiguous jurisdictions into the Procrus
tean bed of one of the two prototypes. In

Holt, the city had to be

either a "political community" or a "mere technique." It is obvious
that it fit neither model well - that was the problem - yet legal
discourse had no approach that could take account of that reality.
Another misleading temptation is to see the opposition as sub
terfuge, a trick that blinds us to the truth. One might say: "Yes!
The discourse does not reflect reality; therefore, whenever a juris
diction is described as synthetic, it may

really be organic. Likewise,

whenever we are told it is organic, look out!

It

is probably syn

thetic. The hegemonds will try to undermine real communities by
describing jurisdictions as synthetic and thereby deny the communi
ties' control over them. Meanwhile, the elite will set up their own
jurisdictions for their own sinister purposes and claim that these
newly minted creations are products of the organic soil, as if the
Trojan horse were flesh and blood." This way of thinking is equally
problematic. It accepts the terms of the discursive opposition as
truth and questions only the motives of the speaker and the accu
racy of the description.
The opposition does not simply reflect reality, but neither does
it create an illusion or a lie. Instead it tells us what to look for, what
to consider, how to organize our thinking. It constructs reality, not
in the sense of creating an illusion, but in the sense of acting as a
lens that sharpens certain features and blurs others.
At this point, one might think that although the opposition be
tween synthetic and organic jurisdiction does not describe a pre
political reality, at least the opposition offers tradeoffs among the
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effects predictably associated with the two conceptions. But the de
ployment of this jurisdictional discourse does not have simple,

straightforward or easily predictable social consequences. It is not

true that once one has accepted a particular conception, one is

"committed to its logical consequences." The conceptions do not

have "logical consequences"; instead they have narrative effects
that are multiple, malleable and even contradictory.

For instance, I suggested above that the synthetic conception en

courages technocracy, mobility and fungibility while the organic
conception encourages the recognition of "thick" group identities

that are culturally distinct from larger political and social institu
tions. It seems to follow that if one accepts that a particular com

munity is organic, that person is committed to respect its autonomy.

But the organic community can also be described as one of sev
eral organic components of a larger unity. Here the organic nature
of the parts serves to justify the natural unity of the whole and per

haps the natural subordination of some parts to others. This use of
the organic jurisdiction is suggested by the root of the word "or

ganic": organ. Each of the organs of the body is naturally distinct
from the others, but all are also naturally a part of a larger whole.

The organs are useful to the whole not despite, but because of their
distinctiveness. A body could not function with several hearts but

no lungs. The fact that the organs are distinct in no way suggests

that they are or should be autonomous. To the contrary, their dis

tinctiveness is evidence of their interdependence. Organic jurisdic

tions can be represented as organs of the state, whose very

distinctiveness is necessary to their function as servants of a larger

whole. Hence, one might insist on the organic distinctiveness of a

jurisdiction, not to support its autonomy, but to insure its
subordination.

Similarly, we might · imagine that the discursive strategy by

which a central government would secure its integrity would be to

insist on the synthetic nature of its component parts: "Each of the
provinces of the nation are but the creations of the Crown; each is

normatively inconsequential in and of itself; each exists only to

serve the nation." But an equally effective centralization tactic

might be to assert the distinctiveness and uniqueness of its subparts,

but only in order to subsume them under a greater whole: "Each of
the provinces of the nation is unique, precious and therefore an in

dispensable part of the nation; we must control you because your

uniqueness is necessary to the greater good."
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As we shall see, this discourse in which communities or territo

ries are defined as organically distinct but also as parts of a larger

organic whole is a very common dynamic in the history of

jurisdiction.

4. Ideology and Covert Status
As the

Holt case demonstrates, jurisdiction presents a problem

for liberal ideology. The rights and duties of citizens vary depend

ing on their membership in a jurisdiction. Yet such disparities are

not easily justified. Membership in a jurisdiction is not entirely vol

untary: the community of Holt could not simply elect to become

residents of Tuscaloosa. Nor are jurisdictional distinctions obvi
ously justified on other grounds. As the Holt.court admits, jurisdic

tional lines are "arbitrary."33 Therefore, jurisdictions would appear

to undermine liberty, equality and justice. .Jurisdictional distinc

tions seem no more just than distinctions based on accident of birth;

the established right of residency seems no better than the divine

right of kings. In a sense, jurisdictional distinctions are simply a
different form of these more obvious status distinctions.

The dialogical opposition between organic and synthetic juris

dictions serves an important ideological function in this context.

Recall that each pole of the opposition suggests a distinct and oppo

site relationship to government, bureaucracy and the state. The or

ganic jurisdiction is defined as prepolitical. It is the codification of
a relationship between people and soil that precedes centralized

government or state planning. If the organic jurisdiction creates in

equalities, these inequalities can and perhaps must be tolerated be

cause they are not created by the state; instead they are the product
of nature. Nature need not exclude human agency - here, nature

is opposed not to man, but to artifice or to government. A concern
for individual liberty and a respect for nature come together in the
idea of a "human nature" that political institutions must respect.

For instance, the rural town is often described as something that
occurs without state intervention.

It

reflects nature - a natural

communion of people who work a common soil and rely on each
other. Perhaps it is natural for people of "like minds" to gather

together, so the decision of people of one religion or one ethnic

group to form an exclusive community is also "natural" because it
reflects "human nature." Even if such jurisdictional divisions pro-

33. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60

(1978).
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duce inequalities that are normatively troubling, the inequalities ap
pear inevitable.
The synthetic jurisdiction, by contrast, is the product of govern
ment; it is created with governmental policy in mind. It does not
have the justification of nature but, instead, the justification of neu
trality. According to the conventional alibi, the synthetic jurisdic
tion does not create significant social divisions.

It is simply the

medium for the administration of some policy of central govern
ment. This is how the Holt majority treated Tuscaloosa: the bound
aries were beyond justification, they were as just as a lottery. The
synthetic jurisdiction does not reflect systematic bias but rather
good and bad luck: "We had to draw the line

somewhere. " More

over, because the jurisdiction is synthetic it can, by definition, al
ways be described as normatively inconsequential so long as its
opponents have recourse to the government that created it.
As long as the two poles of the opposition describe

all of reality,

territorial jurisdiction is not normatively problematic. If all impor
tant jurisdictions are organic and therefore natural and all artificial
jurisdictions are synthetic and therefore inconsequential or at least
perfectly random, then jurisdiction does not create a new form of
status inequality or hierarchy. But if the opposition does not hold
- if many jurisdictions fall between the two poles - then the spec
tre of jurisdiction as involuntary status reemerges. By presenting a
world in which all jurisdictions cluster at one of the two poles, the
dialogical opposition forecloses the possibility that jurisdiction cre
ates a type of involuntary status.
This dialogical opposition between organic and synthetic juris
dictional "types" is a central feature of modern jurisdiction. It is
impossible to sever the dialogical representation of jurisdiction
from its material consequences. As the historical examples in Part
II will show, a central and indispensable feature of jurisdiction is its
ideological function.
II.

A HISTORY OF JURISDICTION

This section will develop three hypotheses about territorial
jurisdiction.

First hypothesis: Jurisdiction is not an ahistorical fixture of
political organization. Territorial jurisdiction may appear to be as
natural and inevitable as the ground we stand on, a natural out
growth of the very existence of government. But instead, the emer
gence of jurisdiction is the product of the coincidence of two
innovations, one technological - the science of cartography - and
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one normative - the ideology of rational, humanist government.
Each development was necessary. Cartography created the concep
tual space of jurisdiction, while the aspirations of rational govern
ment provided the incentive to direct the ordering potential of the
map inward - toward national consolidation and the administra
tion of government - as well as outward - toward defense and
conquest. Therefore we can speak of jurisdiction as a technology
that was "invented" or "introduced" in a given social setting at a
particular time.

Second hypothesis: We can tie certain historical developments
in the art of government to the availability of jurisdiction as a tool,
just as we can tie certain developments in the art of war to the avail
ability of gunpowder. When jurisdiction emerged, it advanced a set
of identifiable social projects.

It

disrupted existing social relations

based on personal status and replaced them with a set of social rela
tionships based on territorial location. To use the terms of private
law, it initiated a shift from statuses

in gross or in personam to sta

tuses bound to political territory. Further, jurisdiction produced a
new set of governmental institutions and helped to construct a type
of political subjectivity that was amenable to a new and more com
prehensive form of institutional knowledge, management and
control.

Third hypothesis: Centralization of power and jurisdictional
subdivision

are

not

antithetical.

Territorial

jurisdiction

was

deployed through a rhetorical strategy that described some territo
ries as simply administrative districts - in other words, synthetic
jurisdictions - and described others as the territories of distinctive
social groups - in other words, organic jurisdictions. Both descrip
tions were indispensable and both were used by a number of differ
ent social actors with different normative aspirations and practical
projects. The emerging national governments needed to assert the
sameness

and uniformity of all their subjects

and therefore

deployed the synthetic description to downplay regional or local
difference. But at the same time they needed to emphasize local
distinctiveness because such distinctiveness helped to distinguish
one nation from another. They used the organic description for this
purpose. Meanwhile local elites needed to become part of the na
tional system in order to avoid being eliminated altogether by supe
rior national powers. But at the same time they needed to assert
their distinctiveness in order to avoid complete assimilation by na
tional bureaucracies. Thus both national and local elites oscillated
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between the synthetic and organic conception of sub-national

jurisdictions.

These are historically specific hypotheses, not claims of a uni

versal social "logic." Below are several historical examples that

lend support to these hypotheses. Of course, there are many histor

ical contexts that I have not addressed.

These hypotheses are

designed to inaugurate a long-term, systematic study of jurisdiction.

What follows is only a modest beginning of an ambitious project.
A.

From Status to Locus

Nineteenth-century Thailand, then called Siam by English

speakers, provides a striking illustration of the historical emergence

of jurisdiction. The history of Thailand is one of rapid transition

from a non-bounded, fluid and ambiguous notion of territory to a
system of strictly delimited and objectively defined national and
sub-national jurisdictions.

The Thai example is convenient because of an especially sophis

ticated and detailed study of the history of Thai national geography
produced by Thongchai Winichakul.34 According to Winichakul,

the Thai state did not develop a concept of territorial jurisdiction

until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Until then, Siam had

none of the characteristics of jurisdictional authority. It did not

control a contiguous territory defined by fixed and objective bor

ders. Instead, it controlled a set of specific, non-adjacent places ac

cording to their proximity and usefulness to Bangkok; it controlled
specific resources, trade routes or populations. It did not conceive
of its authority in terms of territory. Instead, political authority op
erated by status hierarchy, with the elites in Bangkok at the top and

various minor rulers occupying tiers in a dynastic pyramid. Hierar

chical relations between various rulers and subjects, not control
over continuous territory, defined Siam.

In the existing system of provincial control, which was based on the
hierarchical network of lordship among local rulers under the nobles
in Bangkok, a small town could request a change of dependence on
one lord to another . ... The new lord might be the ruler of a town
which was not adjacent to it. The domain of a regional lord could
even be discontinuous.35
Territory that was neither occupied nor the source of valuable

resources was simply not "claimed" by any authority - in effect,

there was nothing to rule. Even the border between the bitter ene34. See WINICHAKUL, supra note 25.
35. Id. at 120.
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mies Siam and Burma was not sharply defined in areal terms.
" [B]oth sides regarded the [border] towns as rich sources of food
and manpower for fighting . . . . "36 B oundaries were defined by
concrete landmarks or in narrative terms rather than in the abstract
cartographic terms of a coordinate grid. As a result, boundaries
were not thin demarcating lines but rather substantial regions or
zones. Moreover, boundaries were indeterminate, even potentially
mobile: " [One] boundary was identified . . . by teak forests, moun
tains upon mountains, muddy ponds where there were three pago
das, Maprang trees, three piles of stones, the space between the
White Elephant (?) and the Nong River . . . . "37
This state of affairs persisted until the end of the nineteenth cen
tury when Siamese rulers began to negotiate with the British and
French colonial powers, who insisted on definite jurisdictional
boundaries. In the course of negotiation and conflict with the Eu

ropean colonial powers, the Bangkok elites came to understand
that political territorialism was a powerful tool. The map set the
terms of negotiation and of conflict; cartography became the very
language in which power and resources were described.38 As the
significance of the geographical border grew for the rulers in
Bangkok, the regime supplanted its narrative, concrete understand
ing of its realm with a jurisdictional one. " [T]he transition from a
time when the frontier towns were known by name to a time when
they were known by a map . . . . took place in a rather short period:
the final two decades of the nineteenth century."39
Bangkok needed territorial control and coherence, in order
both to guard against external threats and to serve the internal
needs of a rapidly modernizing society. Externally, the British in
sisted on a strict demarcation and centralization of authority in or
der to negotiate binding trade agreements,40 while the French
threatened to take control of ambiguously held. towns in the north
ern Mekong region by force.41 As the Siamese elites employed
European cartographic technologies they increasingly understood
their government in jurisdictional terms:

36. Id. at 62.
37. Id. at 70.
38. See id. at 129 ("[Modem cartography was] a new geographical 'language' by which
information originated and the new notion of the realm of Siam was conceived. It became a
framework for thinking, imagining, and projecting the desired realm.").
39. Id. at 119-20.
40. See Peter Vandergeest & Nancy Lee Peluso, Territorialization and state power in Thai
land, 24 THEORY AND SO CIETY 385, 396 {1995).
41. See WINICHAKUL, supra note 25, at 109-12, 121.
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For the first time the [Thai] regime was attempting to know the units
which comprised the realm in territorial terms. Undoubtedly, this was
a consequence of the new vision created by the modem geographical
discourse of mapping. Mapping was both a cognitive paradigm and a
practical means of the new administration. It demanded the reorgani
zation and redistribution of space to suit the new exercise of adminis
trative power on a territorial basis.42
The Siamese elites remade the regime, changing it from a state

based on an aspatial network of local rulers linked to their subjects

and to the center (Bangkok) by status obligations, to a government

organized by technical expertise and by mapped territory.43 The

birth and hardening of the Siamese administrative state followed

hard on the heels of the first comprehensive survey and definitive

mapping of Siamese territory. The abstract space created by mod

ern cartography, what we will call territorial jurisdiction, was the

midwife of the administrative state.

Although this may be difficult for modern readers to grasp,

before the modern map an areal conception of space simply did not

exist - instead one had this or that village, trade route, forest, rice

field. There was no representation of these various specific entities

that would allow for grouping them together into regions. At the

same time, typological administration was impractical due to the

distance between things of the same type - several days journey

might separate two villages or two rice fields - and because with
out a synoptic conception of space, there was no way to coordinate

the administration of things of similar type. The emergence of an

abstract, mapped conception of the national space facilitated the

reorganization of the state along both territorial and functional

lines.

Once the nation was mapped, it was divided into regions which

could be administered by agents of the state who reported back to

Bangkok.44 The sharing of information that resulted allowed for
functional specialization, a governmental division of labor.45

Further, territorial administration facilitated the collection of

revenue in money form or in goods rather than in labor obligations.

42. Id. at 120.
43. See id. ("[T]he whole country began to shift from the traditional hierarchical relation
ships of rulers to the new administration on a territorial basis."); Vandergeest & Peluso,
supra note 40, at 398.
44. See WINICHAKUL, supra note 25, at 398-99.
45. See Vandergeest & Peluso, supra note 40, at 398 ("Bangkok ministries were reorga
nized by functional specialization . . . the Ministry of Interior and . . . the Ministry of Finance.
New functional Ministries (Agriculture, Education, Defense, Public Works, and others) were
also created.").
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This allowed Bangkok to participate more effectively in trade as
well as to eliminate the last vestiges of the older system of pa
tronage obligations. Local elites, once referred to with honorific
titles denoting status were transformed into positions such as "the

commander protecting territorial integrity."46 In this way the re
gime transformed itself into a modern, administrative state defined
by territorial boundaries and organized by functional divisions:

Income from [trade] monopolies and tax farms allowed the monarchy
to eliminate its reliance on serf obligations and slavery [incidents of
the older system of patronage and status rule] almost entir,ely .. . .
The monarchy in effect transformed layers of nobles and local lords
into salaried officials. Bangkok ministries were reorganized by func
tional specialization ... . the principalities outside of Bangkok were
incorporated into the administrative hierarchy of the Ministry of the
Interior. The lords of the principalities were displaced by provincial
governors who took over local administration.47
Although "[t]he tempo, tactics, problems, and solutions varied from
place to place. . . . the final outcomes were the same: the control of
revenue, taxes, budgets, education, the judicial system, and other
administrative functions by Bangkok

.

.

. ."48 Modern cartography

thus ushered in a new type of government, an administrative state
animated by the ideals of synoptic knowledge and competent man
agement of its domain.
This new government was both more centralized

and more dif

ferentiated than its predecessor. More centralized because it at
tempted to centralize detailed knowledge of its territorial attributes
through surveying and mapping. More differentiated because, for
the first time, it created sharply delineated territorial subdivisions in
order to organize the collection of data and the administration of
state policy.

In order to create a territorial identity the Thai government de
scribed its tributaries as parts of Thailand rather than as allies, affili
ates or even subordinates. For example, during the late 1880s, in
the midst of territorial conflict with colonial France, Bangkok
sought to establish a sovereign relationship over its loosely allied
tributaries in the Lao region. In order to secure the loyalty of the
tributaries, the Thai government, for perhaps the first time, asserted
a territorial and racial identity - one that included the Thai and its
tributaries but excluded the Europeans.

46. See WINICHAKUL, supra note 25, at 106.
47. Vandergeest & Peluso, supra note 40, at 398.
48. WINICHAKUL, supra note 25, at 102.
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[T]he Thai and Lao belong to the same soil. . . . France is merely an
alien who looks down on the Lao race as savage. . . . Although the
Lao people habitually regard Lao as We and Thai as They when only
the two people are considered, comparing the Thai and the French,
however, it would be natural that they regard the Thai as We and the
French as They.49
In the next phase of jurisdictional metamorphosis the Thai gov
ernmental elites reinterpreted the local identities as attributes of a
' larger national identity, as organs of the territorial state or, in
Winichakul's terms, "geo-body."50 As Winichakul notes: "[T]he
losers

[in

the

process

of territorialization]

were

those

tiny

chiefdoms along the routes of both the Siamese and the French
forces. Not only were they conquered . . . but they were also trans
formed into integral parts of the new political space defined by the
new notions of sovereignty and boundary."51 Although the tributa
ries were subordinated to Bangkok, they were also given a territo
rial identity they had not known before.

Territorial jurisdiction

transformed political relationships from a logic of status to one of
location.

In Thailand, the birth of jurisdiction was the birth of synoptic,
universal planning initiated by centralized government and carried
out through jurisdictional division.

It was also the birth of local ter

ritorialism accomplished through bureaucratically recorded and ty
pologized

territorial

"localities."

The

ultimate

result

was

a

transformation to a new type of political subjectivity: Siam became

Thailand.
B.

Nation

as

Empire: The Mapping of Europa

Until at earliest the tenth or eleventh century and perhaps as
late as the fifteenth century, European conceptions of political
space were much like those of pre-modern Siam. Space was under
stood only in concrete terms or in relation to the plan of the divine.

In pre-modern Europe, what appear to modern eyes to be territo
rial communities were in fact simply groups united by kinship, com
mon interests and customs. As Sir Henry Maine notes:

[T]he double proposition that "sovereignty is territorial," i.e. that it is
always associated with the proprietorship of a limited portion of the
earth's surface, and that sovereigns inter se are to be deemed not par
amount, but absolute owners of the state's territory [is assumed to be]
49. Id. (translating CHIRAPORN SATHAPANAWATIHANA, WIKRITrAKAN 411-12) (first al
teration in original).
50. Id. at 129-40.
51. Id. at 129.
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founded on principles of equity and common.. sense . . . capable of
being readily reasoned out in every stage of modem civilisation [sic].
But this assumption . . . is altogether untenable so far as regards a
large part of modem history. . . . It is . . . not true that the territorial
character of sovereignty was always recognised [sic] . . . .52
Instead, Maine asserts, early modem European sovereignty was

split into two conceptions, neither territorial.

On the one hand,

there was what Maine calls "tribe sovereignty"53 practiced by no

madic peoples. These groups "based no claim of right upon the fact

of territorial possession, and indeed attached no importance to it

whatever."54 Instead, the ruler of a nation was king of a people, not
a territory.

On the other hand, a ruler with greater ambitions

would claim imperial or universal dominion:

" [T]he precedent

which suggested itself for his adoption was the domination of the
Emperors of Rome. . . . The chieftain who would no longer call

himself King of the tribe must claim to be Emperor of the world."55
Modem territorial sovereignty was an offshoot of feudalism.

With the accession of the Capetian dynasty in France,56 the title of
the sovereign evolved from King of the Franks (a people) to

King of

France (the territory).57 At that point, the sovereign stood "in the

same relation to the soil of France as the baron to his estate, the

tenant to his freehold . . . . "58 In England, the Norman conquerors

imitated their Frankish cousins and initiated the first truly territo

rial sovereignty in that area. According to Maine, " [e]very subse

quent [European] dominion which was established or consolidated

was formed on the latter [territorial] model."59

Territorial sovereignty had to await the arrival of its technologi

cal midwife, modem cartography. Although cartography in ancient

civilizations may have been fairly sophisticated, modem scientific
cartography was not practiced in Europe until, at earliest, the fif

teenth century. Some system of coordinate geography and carto

graphic projection was developed by the celebrated ancient Greek

astronomer Ptolemy, but it is not clear that Ptolemy himself pro

duced maps. Neither is it clear how much of the work attributed to

52. MAINE, supra note 6, at 98-99.
53. Id. at 100.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 101.
56. The Capetian dynasty ruled France from 987-1328. See 9 ENCYCLOPreDIA BRITANNICA 702 {1970).
57. See MAINE, supra note 6, at 103-04. See also 9 ENCYCLOPreDIA BRITANNICA 702-03.
58. MAINE, supra note 6, at 103-04.
59. Id. at 104.

·
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Ptolemy was in reality the innovation of the Byzantine scholars who

preserved and published his work until the closing years of their

Empire.60 Although ancient Rome must have produced maps for

practical endeavors such as travel, conquest and the cultivation of

land, surviving maps are not drawn to a consistent scale and do not

conform to a system of coordinates or to the rules of any geometric
projection.61 Even after the capture of Greece, it appears that the
Romans had little regard for Greek intellectual accomplishments in
cartography.62
0

In any event, much of ancient cartography, like much of the

knowledge of the ancients in general, was lost to the West during
the middle ages. Medieval world maps depicted the world as a fiat

disc crude�y divided into climatological zones or continents. They

contained little or no detail and did not even aspire to topograph

ical accuracy. Other medieval maps of smaller areas were of two
types. The

strip map recorded the distances between various points

on a route; it depicted the route as a straight line, ignoring direc

tional orientation. The

cadastral map63 defined the extent of settled

or cultivated land, although surveys of settled land were generally
recorded in prose form until well into the fourteenth century.

The earliest known English example of a pictorial map of terri

tory was drawn in about

1300.

Medieval maps were crude and pic

torial by modern standards; the surveyor's tools consisted of a

measuring rod, or "metewand," and a device for laying off right

angles. Maps did not depict territory according to geometric princi

ples or consistent scale; instead they were drawn in perspective or

bird's eye view, and conspicuous objects such as buildings were
drawn in elevation.64

Before the fifteenth century there were few maps of entire

countries. European seafarers developed fairly accurate

portolan
charts by the early fourteenth century, but these charts depicted

only coastal outlines in significant detail, and they had no grid of

longitude and latitude. Instead they were developed by measuring
the distance between two points and the direction one must sail to

60. See LEO BAGROW, HISTORY OF CARTOGRAPHY 33-34 (1964).
61. See id. at 37-38.
62. See id. at 38.
63. The cadastral map served to designate taxable land holdings in order to facilitate tax
collection. See JAMES C. ScoTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IM
PROVE THE HUMAN CoNomoN HAVE FAILED 3, 24 (1998).

64. See id. at 143.
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move between them. The portolan charts were graphic depictions
of " 'catalogue[s] of directions to follow between notable points.' "65

In short, the types of maps prevalent in the pre-modem and

early modem eras were not conducive to the creation of territorial

jurisdictions.

Road maps and itineraries depicted distances be

tween points and in some cases direction. They did not depict terri
tory. Cadastral maps depicted territory, but only relatively small

territories. They used crude techniques of measurement that could

not be compared easily to surveys conducted at other times and in
other places. Tue inaccuracies of such surveying techniques were

tolerable where small areas were concerned and in a context in

which memory and custom could supplement the survey. But those

same inaccuracies would be compounded exponentially if larger
territories were mapped, an undertaking that would require the co

ordination and compilation of multiple surveys.

The cartographic grid was introduced to Europe in the four

teenth century when the ancient Greek manuscript Ptolemy's

Geographia came to Italy after the fall of Byzantium.66 The system

of longitude and latitude was refined resulting in ever more accu

rate and detailed maps. The development of modem cartography

- and territorial jurisdiction - was thereafter marked by steady
progress and periodic milestones.

The first comprehensive national survey was completed in

France in

1789.

It took

121 years to complete and entailed the com
400 surveys that encompassed the entire

pilation of a network of

country.67

1.

The French Connection: Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite

The Thai example illustrated the conditions and consequences

of the birth of jurisdiction. The study of revolutionary era France

will illustrate the development of jurisdiction in a thoroughly cen
tralized national government. Moreover, the French case exempli

fies the link between normative political ideology and jurisdictional
development. France, more than any other European nation, lays

bare the collision of cartography and political ideology that pro

duced the modem jurisdiction. Unlike the Thai history presented

65. David Turnbull, Cartography and Science in Early Modem Europe: Mapping the
Construction ofKnowledge Spaces, 48 lMAoo MUNDI 5, 10 (1996) (quoting MICHEL MoLLAT
DU JouRDIN & MoNIQUE DE LA RoNc!:ERE, SE A CHARTS oF THE EARLY EXPLORERS: 13TII
TO 17TII CENTURY (1984)) (alteration in original).
66. See BAGROW, supra note 60, at 77. But see Turnbull, supra note 65, at 14 (asserting
that the Geographia reached Europe in the thirteenth century).
67. See Turnbull, supra note 65, at 14-18.
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above, what follows may be understood as the transformation of
jurisdiction, rather than its birth. But alternatively, it is the birth of
a modern, technocratic and ideologically laden jurisdiction.
France is also exemplary, if not unique, because of the popular
association of centralization with the development of its national
institutions. For most observers, the French nation-state epitomizes
a modern trend toward the centralization of political power. In
deed, in an elite Encyclopedia under the entry for France, we find
the following astonishing statement: "The whole history of France
is a movement toward centralization and unification."68 Nothing in
this section will challenge this conventional view, but it will suggest
that even in France, centralization of power and culture was accom
plished in surprising, perhaps even paradoxical, ways. Here, as in
Siam, the centralization of power also intensified local territorial
ism. The assertion of local territorial distinctiveness did not, in the
end, undermine ;French centralization. In fact, local territorialism
seems to have been a by-product of comprehensive centralization.
French cartographers of the late 1600s and 1700s performed the
first scientific national map surveys, employing geometrical meth
ods to produce geodetically accurate maps. The national survey
was a huge undertaking, requiring the coordination and compila
tion of hundreds of individual surveys. French scientists, bureau
crats and governmental officials were fascinated with accuracy, not
only in service of the enlightenment ideal of truth, but also for spe
cific administrative and political purposes. Geodetically accurate
maps allowed for coordinated infrastructural projects performed si
multaneously in different regions of the French territorial
"hexagon."
The obsession with geodetic accuracy elevated certain truths at
the expense of others. The early scientific maps emphasized the
metrical properties of abstract space while suppressing the "detail"
of topographical texture and local settlement. "The abstract quality
of the maps, therefore, desacralized space and [therefore] deper
sonalized society."69
The image of France as an empty and homogeneous space ap
pears to have influenced revolutionary jurisdictional reform. A
proposal for a new system of administrative jurisdictions, which
called for the creation of ninety jurisdictions of equal area, was in
fluenced by the national survey maps of the early eighteenth cen68. 9 ENCYCLOPreDIA BRITANNICA 697 (1970).
69. Josef W. Konvitz, The Nation-state, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and Nine
teenth-Century France, 16 J. OF HIST. GEo. 3, 4 (1990).
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tury.70 The new jurisdictional arrangement was to serve several
revolutionary and ideological purposes. Liberte: the new jurisdic
tions would facilitate the uniformly correct application of law
throughout the nation, subordinating local prejudice, hierarchy and
oppression to nationally guaranteed ideals. Egalite: the new juris
dictional map superseded local differences and customary law. The
new divisions, unlike the old, were neutral, homogeneous and egali
tarian. Fratemite: the new territorial divisions would not threaten
to fracture into autonomous entities, and they would suppress the
older divisions that might so threaten. Answering to the metropole,
the administrative deputies would apply metropolitan justice.
Therefore "the redrawing of France's administrative boundaries
was a moral act inspired by and symbolizing the highest political
ideals; it reified the unity of the nation and of civic virtue."71
Alas, the lofty ideals of the revolution had to negotiate with the
legacy of the ancien regime on the ground. Ultimately, eighty-three
jurisdictional departments were created, and a variety of criteria
were considered, including respect for topographical features and
prerevolutionary units. But the end result bears more than an acci
dental resemblance to the earlier proposal.
The French creation of territorial departments served to unify
the nation-state, just as conventional history insists. But this unifi
cation paradoxically also hardened local differences.

It transformed

vague, fluctuating and discontinuous ethnic settlements into territo
rially precise regions and provinces. It presented as a unified and
territorially bounded local culture what had been at best the loosely
similar and in some cases quite dissimilar practices- of numerous ru-

ral villages.

Consider, for example, the famous national effort to displace lo
cal languages with French. To be sure, the typical story of govern
mentally imposed uniformity is true. The government of the First
Republic was concerned about ideological effects of linguistic
fragmentation:

"Reaction speaks Bas-Breton" insisted the Jacobins. "The unity of
the Republic demands the unity of speech . . . . Speech must be one,
like the Republic." [Others] called for the elimination of "the diver
sity of primitive idioms that extended the infancy of reason and pro
longed obsolescent prejudices."72
70. See id. at 4-5.
71. Id. at 6.
72. EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL
FRANCE, 1870-1914, at 73 {1976).
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Until the Third Republic, however, the French government was
unable to develop an effective policy to promote linguistic unity.
As late as

1891, the Minister of the Interior feared that local dialect

"may endanger French unity."73 In the late nineteenth century "fa
miliarity with French in the countryside was still cause for com
ment. . . . In 1879 a folklorist could still publish a parable of the
prodigal son in 88 different patois."74
Ultimately, French linguistic unity indeed destroyed local cul
tures and local idioms - the idiosyncratic speech of rural villages
and towns. But it did not, by and large, displace flourishing re

gional languages and cultures. Many of the so-called regional lan
guages that were supposedly destroyed by the hegemony of French
were, in the late nineteenth century, still in fact collections of mutu
ally incomprehensible village patois:

Nor was Breton one tongue, or Limousin, or the so-called langue
d'Oc [all "regional languages"]. Vannetais was incomprehensible to
most other Bretons; men from Leon found it hard to understand
those from Guingamp. The old dialectical world was fragmented in
the extreme. Dialect might change from one valley to another, from
high ground to low, from one riverbank to the next, if physical barri
ers made communications difficult.75
Organic, day-to-day social connections gave rise to local dialects,
not regional languages. The conception of a bounded territorial re
gion itself, much less of a regional language or culture, was in a
sense a product of the national project of self knowledge accom
plished through the census and the map. The government of the
Third Republic tracked and typologized the language patterns of its
citizens in terms of the jurisdictional departments developed just af
ter the revolution.76 The grouping together of these myriad local
73. See id. at 74, 301-38.
74. Id. at 75-76. Compulsory education under the Third Republic is commonly and
rightly credited with the rapid advance in French literacy at the expense of the local dialects.
But other, less programmatic factors facilitated the nationalization effort, most notably the
simple fact that the provinces were no longer isolated from each other. Improved highways,
industrialization, national publications and national institutions such as the military brought
people from previously isolated villages into contact with each other. See id. at 301-38.
These social interactions required the diverse population to abandon local dialects: "French
had to be used as a lingua franca." Id. at 78.
The local dialects were indeed "organic": they were part of the historical practice of
people in their day to day lives. But so was the shift to French, a shift that could not have
occurred through state coercion alone. "The factors that worked against French in the old
isolated world, self-sufficient in far more realms than mere subsistence, turned against local
idioms as that world changed. [A local dialect] was useless beyond a certain area that had
once seemed vast but became increasingly limited in the perspective of the modem world."
Id. at 86.
75. Id. at 86.
76. See id. at 75-77.
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dialects into regional languages is an act of intellectual interpreta
tion, the work of cartographers and lexicographers, not nature or
history.77 The languages that "belonged" to these regions were also
projections which gave a diversity of local practices a common pedi
gree they neither earned nor desired. Intellectuals and activists re
acting to the Third Republic's project of centralization created
regional literary traditions when for centuries there had been only
the spoken patois of rural life, different from village to village:

In 1854 a group of young poets and intellectuals concerned for the
preservation of the speech and literature of Oc founded the Felibrige
. . . . To revivify their native language, the Felibres sought to create a
literature. But literature needs a reading public, and such a public
was hard to find. The country people, when they learned to read,
learned to read in French . . . . Furthermore, people who used forms
of speech that were highly localized and in constant evolution found it
hard to understand a literary language that was often archaic . . . .
[The Felibres] address[ed] country people in literary Proven�al and
[were] met with uncomprehending stares.
In fact, the Felibrige seems to have been a political reaction initi
ated on a plane several removes away from ordinary people, and from
their concems.78
Of course Provern;al did exist; it was spoken and written in what
is now Southern France as early as the twelfth century. But by the
fourteenth century it had fragmented into a multitude of local dia77. To be sure, the lexicographers were describing something when they catalogued
French regional languages. Most notably, there was a linguistic divide between northern
France and the Midi (south). The Midi - which was thoroughly Romanized earlier than the
rest of Gaul and was less affected by Germanic and Frankish influences in the Middle Ages
- developed dialects that remained closer to Latin than those of Northern France. This is
responsible for the linguistic split between northern French and the langue d'oc ("oc" being
the term for "yes" in the Midi dialects, as compared to "oil" and later "oui" in the north).
The term "Provenyal," or "langue d'oc, " is used in two separate ways, often conflated. In
strictly linguistic terms, it refers to all of the southern dialects which retain the greater Latin
influence. Provenyal is co=only divided into at least three broad languages: Provenyal
proper, Auvergnat and Limousin, and Gascon. Each of these is in turn divided into scores of
local dialects.
In literary terms, Provenyal refers to the standard language of the troubadour poets of the
twelfth, thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. This literary language was standardized
and used widely throughout the Midi before the incorporation of that area under Frankish
rule. But it is doubtful that literary Provenya! - as opposed to local idiom - was ever
employed as a spoken language beyond a rarefied literary elite. Moreover, literature was
written and performed in literary Provenyal outside the Midi, in Northern Spain and Italy
where nobles held it in high esteem. It was less a regional language than an inter-regional
literary language. In any event, the demise of Provenyal began in the 13th century when war
ruined the southern nobles who patronized the troubadours - long before the Third Repub
lic and its project of centralization. Thus long before the eighteenth century, high Provenyal
was no longer spoken nor written in the Midi: the langue d'oc had become a collection of
local dialects. See 18 ENCYCLOPreDIA BRITANNICA 680-82 (1970).
78. WEBER, supra note 72, at 80 (emphasis added). Again, this is not to deny the histori
cal existence of literary Provenyal. See supra note 77.
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lects. And it was not a territorial language that competed with and
was displaced by French, at least not until the nineteenth century.
The emergence of common languages that were both universally
written and spoken in territorially bounded regions required the co
ordination of translations, prohibitions and disciplines on a scale
that was impossible without the organization of the centralized
state, the textual multiplication of the Guttenberg press and the
synopticism of the modem map.79 And we can surmise that the
world was knowable in terms of bounded regions only after the
metropolitan project of synoptic mapping. Before the metropole
and its maps, local culture was experienced "on site" as the culture
of a certain village settlement. Regions, if they were conceived of
at all, blurred at the margins, one into another.
The limited regionalism of nineteenth century France can be
seen as a kind of failed nationalism. It mirrored the nationalist
strategy of producing a synthetic homogeneity within a precise,
mapped territory. The threat of a very real centralization project
produced a reaction in the form of a "defense of the local." This
reaction was itself thoroughly caught up in the metropolitan dis
course of the map. The guardians of local culture did not think,
perhaps could not think, to defend the local except on the terms
and with the weapons with which it was being attacked: these were
territorial terms and territorial weapons. The provinces were led to
defend, not organic local life but an image of the organic that was
itself an artifact of the centralization effort they opposed. Far from
destroying regional culture, centralization in this sense created it.

2.

The British Invasion: Jurisdictional Centralization and the
Common Law

The birth of English jurisdiction went hand in glove with the
consolidation of the English common law. Thus, the history of Eng
lish jurisdiction illuminates the critical link between territory and
legal practice that is a defining characteristic of the modern
jurisdiction.
Although the common law was said to unify and to some degree
define England, both historically and territorially, until the seven79. See, e.g., BENEDICT .ANDERSON, IMAGINED CoMMUNmES: REFLECTIONS ON THE OR
IGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM at 40-42, 77-79 (1983). Anderson notes that early mod
em languages-of-state in Europe were just that: languages used by and for the administrative
state. There was no attempt to impose them on the subject populations who went on speak
ing local dialects. There was a systematic attempt to impose national languages in Europe
only in the 19th century, the same period of time that, according to Anderson, the very idea
of the nation-state matured.
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teenth century it did neither. The common law was fractured and
inconsistent. The common law competed with, and likely borrowed
from, a collection of other practices: "Roman civil law, canon law
and a bewildering variety of local customary law."8° This legal cor
nucopia was not administered by a unified and coordinated system
of justice but instead by "national, regional and local courts, ecclesi
astical and secular courts, courts occasional and permanent . . .
courts of considerable antiquity and courts newly erected or ·as
serted, courts swamped with business and courts moribund for lack
of suitors."81 Until the fifteenth century, ecclesiastical courts pre
sided over matters such as marriage, succession, heresy and any dis
pute involving a member of the clergy or the property of the
church. Commercial transactions were administered through sepa
rate mercantile courts.82 Feudal lords retained the right to hold
court over their subjects as an incident of property ownership.83
The legal system was also fractured territorially.

The pre

Norman local divisions of the "shire" and "hundred" not only sur
vived the Conquest, but also continued to administer justice with
separate courts of overlapping jurisdiction.84 These were the clos
est medieval England had to territorial jurisdictions, but they had
few of the qualities we associate with jurisdictions today.
Most notably, they did not have definite territorial boundaries.
Prior to the fifteenth century, modem surveying was not practiced
in England.85 As a result, maps were schematic rather than geo
detic. Often the only description of an estate or territory was a
written narrative.86 Measures were fluid, locally varied and approx
imate. Land "rights were sometimes marked by the cast of a ham
mer; the boundary between the shires of · Cambridge and
Huntingdon ran in some of the meres 'as far a man might reach
with his barge-pole to the shore'; the day's journey and the morn
ing's ploughing were other convenient units."87
80. WILFRID PREST, THE PROFESSIONS IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 65 (1987).
81. Id.
82. See 6 ENCYCLOPO:DIA BRITANNICA 163 (1970).
83. In support of uncontroversial and accepted facts of canonical English history, I will
cite the account provided in the Encyclopcedia Britannica. See 8 ENCYCLOPO:DIA BRITAN
NICA 549 (1970).
84. See NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 77-78
(1994).
85. See BAGROW, supra note 60, at 143-44, 165.
86. See id. at 143.
87. H.C. Darby, The Agrarian Contribution to Surveying in England, 82 GEOGRAPHICAL
JOURNAL 529, 530 (1933).
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Many early English towns88 were autonomous entities that were
not legally recognized at all. During the Norman period, propertied
lords established towns on their lands in order to take advantage of
the benefits of commerce.89 In some cases, the lord would obtain a
royal charter to establish a market and the settlement would fol
low.90 In other cases, settlers established autonomous institutions
in the form of guilds which were granted the privilege of regulating
the important trades and crafts within the cities. The guilds took on
many of the functions that we associate with government today.91
Jurisdiction in these localities was an incident of status, property or
commercial monopoly, not a subdivision of centralized government.
Even those cities that were formally recognized were not terri
torial jurisdictions. During the feudal period many cities were col
l e ctive enterpris es92 within the system of feud al estates
administered by the Crown.93 The medieval borough did not exist
as a separate entity; it was simply the association of its individual
burgesses.94 Residence was not a criterion for membership; many
nonresidents were citizens and most residents were not citizens.95
Rights to citizenship were hereditary and in some municipal corpo
rations membership could be purchased.96
Cities did exercise what we today think of as legal, if not territo
rial, jurisdiction. They established their own courts, selected jurors
from their members and elected their own sheriffs.97 But cities
were not the only entities to exercise jurisdiction. Since the entity
exercising jurisdiction was formally an aterritorial corporate group,
there was no reason that other corporations could not exercise ju88. Although there were formal distinctions between cities, towns and villages, these dis
tinctions changed over time and the terms seem to have been used inconsistently. As a re
sult, many historical co=entators use the terms interchangeably.
89. See MAX WEBER, THE CITY 133 (1958); THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL ToWN: A READER
URBAN HisroRY, 1200-1540, at 5 (Richard Holt & Gervase Rosser eds., 1990)
MEDIEVAL T oWN].
90. See MEDIEVAL TOWN, supra note 89, at 5.
91. See id. at 9, 12; see also SrR PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS, A LICENSE To TRADE: THE Hrs.
TORY OF ENGLISH CHARTERED COMPANIES 4-7 {1974).
92. Terminology can be confusing in this regard. For instance, although practically speak
ing, municipal corporations may have existed as early as the reign of Edward I {1272-1307),
the first charter granting incorporation seems to have been issued in 1343. See JENNIFER
LEVIN, THE CHARTER CoNTROVERSY IN THE CITY OF LoNDON, 1660-1688, AND ITS CONSE
QUENCES 63 {1969).
93. See WEBER, supra note 89, at 135.
94. See LEVIN, supra note 92, at 64.
95. See WEBER, supra note 89, at 134-35.
96. See id. at 136.
97. See id. at 133-34, 135-36.
ENGLISH
[hereinafter

IN
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risdiction over territory as well. Jurisdiction was often an attribute
of the trade monopolies that were common in the mercantile pe
riod. Because local government evolved from the commercial rela
tionships of the guilds, the power of sovereignty was understood as
an incident of the regulation of trade. For example, many of the
American colonies were established and governed by chartered cor
porations.98 As late as the 1770s Edmund Burke · complained that
the East India Company " 'did not seem to be merely a Company
formed for the extension of the British commerce, but in reality a
delegation of the whole power and sovereignty of this kingdom sent
into the East.' "99
The centralization of legal authority required imposing a single
legal system and coordinating territorial jurisdictions. English com
mon law potentially supplied the former. The word "common" de
notes not only the customary origins, but also the universality of
English case law. The ideology that emerged with the Writings of
Sir Edward Coke in the early seventeenth century presented the
common law as the unified law of England from "time out of
mind. "100 After his dismissal from the King's Bench in 1616, Coke
joined the antiroyalists. Largely through his interpretive efforts, the
common law became a significant source of power that could oper
ate autonomous of the Tudor Crown and its royally controlled
courts, such as the chancellor's court of equity and the infamous

Star Chamber.101 Against the expansion of centralized royal power
through the "Prerogative Courts," Coke and the common lawyers
argued for the jurisdiction of the common law.
But Coke did not favor a return to the decentralized patchwork
of local courts and courts of specific categorical jurisdiction. Coke
instead wished to ensure the

centralization of legal authority in the

common law courts. For Coke, the common law defined England
as a nation; it distinguished the sceptered isle from the continent,

with its Latin and Justinian codes.102 As such, it had to be both
distinct from the laws of the continent and also uninterrupted
within England. It had to either encompass or supersede all local
98. See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, EMPIRE AND INTEREST: THE AMERICAN COLONIES
THE PoLmCS OF MERCANTILISM (1970); RUDOLPH ROBERT, CHARTERED COMPANIES
94-120 (1969).

AND

99. See GRIFFITHS, supra note 91, at 99 (quoting 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA
182 (1929)).
100. See 6 ENCYCLOPO:DIA BRITANNICA at 164 (1970); BLOMLEY, supra note 84, at 73.
101. See BLOMLEY, supra note 84, at 73, 75-77.
102. See BLOMLEY, supra note 84, at 74.
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with the history of England, co

extensive with English territory, and common to all of England.103
These needs were at loggerheads. On the one hand, the "com
mon law" that served England since time immemorial was local,
fragmented and historically discontinuous.

It

was not uniquely

English, nor did it encompass all of English practice. Instead, it was
a bricolage of local customs, autonomous courts, independent legal
practices and foreign imports. On the other hand, the comprehen
sive, consistent and conclusive common law that Coke masterfully
expounded was a creation of the genius of his own era. To be sure,
Coke's common law drew on the ancient traditions of the shire and
hundreds courts, the manorial courts and the justice of the citi€:'.S,
but it necessarily drew on them selectively. Perhaps every part of
the common law Coke advanced had been practiced somewhere in
England at some time in its history, but no part was practiced
everywhere, nor was all of it practiced anywhere.
In order to establish the comprehensiveness of the common law,
Coke and the common lawyers had to deny the distinctiveness of
local institutions and customary law. Yet at the same time they had
to assert that very distinctiveness in order to give the common law
the organic connection to England that would distinguish it from
Roman or Justinian law. The effacing of local custom was there
fore, "an ambiguous move . . . the local customs [that were to be
effaced] . . . were [also] those that supposedly provided the 'com
munal' underpinnings to the common law."104
The contest between the common law and the royal Prerogative
Courts was not, then, a contest between centralization and decen
tralization of power, but instead between different projects of cen
tralization.

One project employed the positive authority of the

Crown to create new institutions. The other sought to assimilate
the older institutions, rationalizing them and bringing them under a
comprehensive organization, while at the same time retaining and
exploiting the legitimacy of their antiquity and organic pedigree.
The latter strategy produced the more resilient institutions. The
Prerogative Courts were later abolished and the Chancery, which
administered the law of equity, only barely survived.105 The asser
tion of the local and the organic was a part of a successful strategy
of centralization.
103. See id. at 75.
104. Id. at 76.
105. The chancellor's courts were later absorbed into the common law courts in 1873. See
6 ENCYCLOP<:eDIA BRITANNICA 165 {1970).
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The consolidation of English territorial jurisdiction mirrored
Coke's construction of the common law. In a process remarkably
similar to the jurisdictional modernization of Siam, the post
Conquest regimes brought the multiplicity of autonomous institu
tions into the service of a national government. Pieces of the previ
ously autonomous institutions were enlisted as organs of the
centralized nation:

[M]any local institutions . . . began to change from an element within
a localized and relatively autonomous set of legal institutions and
practices to a component within a national system. They became, for
the first time, component parts of the "local state," charged with the
"bottom-up" task of collecting spatial information on crime and disor
der, and the "top down" task of administering central law. . . . [T]heir
new location [was] within a "vertical" system of spatial surveillance
and administration.106
Towns and cities first became corporations limited by the terms of
their charters and, later, simply governmental subdivisions.
The older territorial institutions were subordinated to the na
tional government, but they were not always stripped of their uni
queness. Instead, their distinctive attributes were sometimes used
to define the identity of English government. For instance, the ma
jority of the members of the British House of Commons were
drawn from the "ancient" local boroughs (rather than districts of

equal population) until 1884.107 Such a recognition of local jurisdic

tions is commonly seen as an antidote to the power of centralized
government. But the political recognition of organic jurisdictions
can also serve
government.

as

a vehicle for the projects

of centralized

Consider, for example, the extension of the organic conception
of jurisdiction found in the English political theorist and statesman
Edmund Burke's idea of "virtual representation." Until reform in
the late nineteenth century, representation in the British House of
Commons was not apportioned according to population. Instead,
various local jurisdictions had the right to send members. Repre
sentation was ad hoc. Some cities had representation while others
did not, and those cities with representation varied greatly in size
and importance.108 This understandably led to agitation for the ex
tension of the franchise to the unrepresented towns. Although
Burke supported the extension of the franchise in some cases, he
rejected the familiar conception of political representation that
106. BLOMLEY, supra note 84, at 78.
107. See 17 ENCYCLOP<:eDIA BRITANNICA 383 (1970).
108. See id.
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holds that every citizen must have an equally weighted vote. Ac
cording to Burke, good parliamentary representation should guar
antee that all of the interests of the people were represented, not all
of the people themselves. Burke surmised that any community
would be well represented in government as long as any representa
tive shared its interests: "Although the city of Birmingham elects no

members to Parliament, it can still be virtually represented there

because Bristol sends members; and these are really representatives
of the trading interest, of which Birmingham, too, is a part."109 Bir
mingham would be "virtually represented" by the Bristolite.

It

was unobjectionable, in Burke's scheme, that while Bristol

and Birmingham "shared" a representative, another jurisdiction
may have a representative all to itself. It was equally unobjection
able that another jurisdiction may be far smaller in population and
yet have the same number of representatives. The entity repre
sented was to be the jurisdiction, or more precisely, the interest, not
the individual.110
One commentator complained that, in Burke's scheme, one did
not need elections at all. "If a citizen does not need a vote to be
well represented, why should any citizen have votes?"111 Perhaps
this criticism is unfair. We may conclude that some actual represen
tation is necessary to ensure that the popular House has access to,
and an incentive to act on, accurate information about the needs
and preferences of the people as a whole.11 2 But one may well ask:
"Why represent separate jurisdictions?" Burke tacitly assumed an
organic fusing of territory and a specific, easily defined interest.
Although Burke envisioned that many jurisdictions could share an
interest - Bristol and Birmingham are both "trading cities" Burke's virtual representation seems to exclude the possibility that
many interests may compete within one jurisdiction, or that interest
and jurisdiction may not coincide at all. Since Burke is concerned
with representing conceptually defined interests - not places Burke's representational scheme must consider geography a proxy
for interest.
So why assume, as Burke does, that the salient interests are ar
ranged territorially? Nothing in his idea of virtual representation
109. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 174 (1967).
110. See, e.g., EDMUND Burum, Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, in 4 THE WoRKS OF TIIE
RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND Burum 241, 293 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1869) {1792);
PITKIN, supra note 109, at 174-75; see also SACK, supra note 23, at 131.
111. Robert M. Hutchins, The Theory of Oligarchy: Edmund Burke, in 5 THE THOMIST
61, 65 (1943).
112. Indeed this is Burke's response. See PITKIN, supra note 109, at 177-78.
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requires the representation of boroughs as
counsels against it. If it is

boroughs and much
interests, and not individuals, that are to

be represented, would it not be better simply to elect a representa
tive of the particular

interest in question - a representative of trad

ing interests rather than a representative of Bristol who "virtually
represents" Birmingham? A Burkean may object that we cannot,
in advance, identify the interests that should be represented. Per
haps not, but that is precisely what Burke's virtual representation
requires us to do. How else are we to know which jurisdictions can
be virtually represented and by whom?113

In Burke's scheme, the organic jurisdiction functions as a tech
nique of the central government. Virtual representation does not

discover the relevant political interests, but instead must define
ideological function

them. But geography does serve an important

in Burke's scheme: it makes the represented interests appear ob
jective, natural and hence uncontroversial. Imagine the popular re
action if, rather than selecting the boroughs to be represented in the
House of Commons, parliament were to have explicitly decided
that certain interests were worthy of representation and others were
not, or that certain interests deserved a greater say than others. Be
cause the boroughs preexisted Burke's scheme - some were called
"ancient" - the interests he identified also seemed of ancient pedi
gree and status. Behind Burke's description of political interests
lies the implication that a given interest self evidently belongs to a
given jurisdiction or number of jurisdictions. The subtle suggestion
that geography itself defines the interests in question makes
Burke's scheme rhetorically palatable.
The division of the body politic into organic territorial jurisdic
tions, then, can be seen as a part of a highly centralized scheme of
political control - a scheme that recognizes particular interests and
fails to recognize others and that defines and organizes groups
through political territories. No matter how well intentioned and
sincere the attempt to define the interests and their territories, the
attempt is anything but neutral or apolitical. Similarly, the idea of
organic jurisdiction - a territorially defined organization that is
also defined by specific interests - can be a conceptual abstraction
and a governmental technique, no less so than the abstract space of
the synthetic grid.

113. See id. at 174-75.
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Common Law, Common Themes

In the divergent national contexts of Thailand, France and Eng
land the evolution of territorial jurisdiction exhibited some com
mon features. In all three cases the centralization of power was
accompanied by the creation of local jurisdictional subdivisions.
And in each case the national elites seem to have confronted local
difference with ambivalence. Local difference threatened national
solidarity. But in some cases the nationalists actually produced and
emphasized local difference through territorialism. They, like the
European nationalists described by Thomas Heller, were

primarily bricolleurs . . . . They pasted together national communities
from selected bits of the familiar social order and cautious allusions to
putatively natural distinctions they found in the popular conscious
ness. The pre-modem nongovernmental order of church, class, guild,
corporation, and family . . . were defended and established by the
nation-state as the defining features of national identity. State re
sources financed their growth and reproduction. State powers were
delegated to them to assure and, in many cases, increase their contin
uing relevance. . . . [T]heir particular roles in governance and the or
ganization of everyday life were the stuff from which national
communities of character and obligation were articulated.114
On the one hand, autonomous local institutions based on expe
rience and proximity were being replaced with or transformed into
capillaries of the national government. But at the same time, these
institutions had to retain certain elements of the local and the or
ganic. Their surveillance function was more than simply that of the
spy or imperial mole, an agent who stands apart from what it
records. Instead, the local jurisdiction bore witness to its own iden
tity. Rather than surveillance and reporting, the function was that
of confession and autobiography.
D.

Jurisdiction American Style

During the past century, local society has become part of a national
economy; its status and power hierarchies have come to be
subordinate parts of the larger hierarchies of the nation.115

It is

commonly asserted that American political history is char

acterized by the progressive centralization of power at the expense
of locally distinctive political communities such as the states and
114. Thomas C. Heller, Modernity, Membership, and Multiculturalism, 5:2 STAN. HUMAN.
REv. 3, 48 (1997).
115. c. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 39 (1956).
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local governments.116 Often implicit in this analysis is an under
standing that territorial control is primarily exercised through ho
mogenization and the assimilation of local difference. As we have
seen, the relationship between centralized power and local political
territorialism was more complicated in other national contexts. The
same is true in the United States. Of course, a good deal of central
ization did take place, as the typical view supposes. But centraliza
tion and the repression of local difference is only part of the story.
Simultaneously, local difference was being produced and enshrined,
not only as an act of resistance to centralized power, but also as a
mechanism of the c�ntralization of power.
American jurisdictional development differed from that of both

Thailand and Europe in significant ways. In_ the United States a
much weaker state bureaucracy and national elite was overshad
owed in importance by a mobile, free market oriented and cultur
ally

anarchic

civil

society.117

Communal

relationships

were

understood as private rather than as within the domain of the
state.118 National culture was fractured and national citizenship
was thin. In this context, the "centralization" of jurisdictional con
trol entailed the disruption of local communal power in favor of
individual mobility and the dominance of the private economic
market. The same American republicanism that rejected the Anglo
mercantile corporation also distrusted its cousin, the municipal cor
poration.119 This ideology sought to control local government by
narrowing its influence on social life and by subordinating it to
116. This assertion is co=on to many discussions of postwar American society. Ameri
can federalism and the self-styled "co=unitarian" movement decry the "loss of co=u
nity" in American society. See, e.g., AMrrAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF CoMMUNITY: RIGHTS,
REsPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); RosABETH Moss KANTER,
COMMITMENT AND CoMMUNITY 169-75 (1972) ("Developing a distinctive culture . . . is much
more difficult today than in the nineteenth century.") MILLS, supra note 115; Phillippe Aries,
The Family and the City in the Old World and the New, in THE CHANGING IMAGES OF THE
FAMILY 29 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1974) (arguing that the city "lost its
vitality" when the state "wiped out . . . frontiers" with the result that governmental "scrutiny
and control extend
into every sphere of activity"). Some authors go further and claim
that modern society generally is characterized by the centralization of numerous aspects of
social and political life including the economic (through global capitalism), the cultural
(through the mass media), and the political (through the national bureaucratic state) realms.
See, e.g., MANuEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS 318-31 (1983).
117. See, e.g, DUNCAN KENNEDY, Radical Intellectuals in American Culture and Politics or
My Talk at the Gramsci Institute, in SEXY DRESSING ETc. 1, 19-20; Heller, supra note 114, at
15-18.
118. See generally Heller, supra note 114.
119. See MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S D1scoNTENT 123-50 (1996). Sandel notes
that cities and European mercantilism were virtually synonymous in the republicanism of
Madison; the two worked hand in glove and both threatened to erode the civic virtue of the
American people. Id. at 137.
.

•

•
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larger units of government with correspondingly thinner social
commitments.

1. A Synthetic Social Fabric
.American jurisdictional development was marked by synthetic

sub-national jurisdictions. These synthetic jurisdictions served both

to strengthen the federal government and perhaps more impor
tantly, to support the homogenizing influence of industrial capital

ism.

Even the

states

are

at

times

understood

as synthetic

territories. Despite constitutional protections120 and the represen

tation of states as states in the Senate - suggesting an organic con

ception in which each state is unique and primary - the states are

generic in status. The Constitution names no specific states, and

Article IV, Section 3 allows for the addition of new states, reflecting

the self-image of a growing, dynamic and mobile nation, a nation of

Gesellschaft communities and convenient jurisdictions.

Further evidence of the synthetic nature of American jurisdic

tions appears iri the Northwest Ordinance of

1787, passed under the

Articles of Confederation. B ased in part on Thomas Jefferson's

1784

plan for governance of the Western Lands ceded by Virginia

to the federal Congress, the plan for the Northwest Territories es

tablished the gnd as the spatial template for jurisdictions:

[T]he territories in the Northwest were expected to be subdivided ac
cording to lines parallel to those of longitude and latitude, and these
were to form components of the states' boundaries when feasible and
the boundaries for practically all of the county, township, and private
parcels of land. This rectangular land survey system was to be used
subsequently through much of the West.121
This conception of jurisdiction was only possible through the in

tersection of modern cartography and political liberalism. Without

the synoptic conception of space provided by the map it would have

been impossible to anticipate the creation of jurisdictions years

before any known settlement took place in territory that no English
speaker had even seen. But more importantly, it would have been

impossible to conceive of jurisdictions in advance of actual settle
ment without an

abstract and generic conception of jurisdiction, a

conception in which any jurisdiction can be thought of abstractly, as

like any other. Generic jurisdictions are not designed to serve spe-

120. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (states must consent to be divided or merged);
U.S. CoNST. amend. X (all powers not specifically granted to the federal government are
reserved to the stat!!s).
121. SACK, supra note 23, at 150; see also MARK MoNMONIER, DRAWING nm LINE,
T ALES OF MAPS AND CARTOCONTROVERSY 112-15 (1995).
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cific social groups or further specific local interests. Instead, they
are designed to serve a mobile population of individuals who will
form generic and fluid communities, each morally equivalent and
fungible. Each jurisdiction provides more or less the same services
and each is in more or less the same relationship to individual citi
zens and to centralized government.
In revolutionary France, a proposal to create administrative ju
risdictions of equal population, as opposed to equal area, was re
jected on the ground that it would require the constant redrawing
of districts as the population changed.122 The nameless French ju
risdictional visionary who advanced the idea would perhaps be grat
ified to learn that, almost 200 years later, his proposal was adopted
in the nation that inspired the French revolution.
Of course I refer to the reapportionment of American congres
sional districts. The epitome of the synthetic jurisdiction is found in
territorial divisions designed to facilitate elections. Although noth
ing in the text of the Constitution requires states to elect their rep
resentatives through equipopulous electoral jurisdictions, most of
the original thirteen colonies had strict districting requirements
designed to equalize population as early as 1780.123 Moreover, the
Constitution mandates reapportionment of representatives accord
ing to population every ten years.124 Both of these facts suggest
that the American conception of jurisdiction was similar to that of
the French in at least one crucial respect: jurisdiction was designed
to mediate between the individual citizen and the national govern
ment and to reflect the principle of individualism and egalitarian
ism. It was the individual first and foremost that was to be
represented; the jurisdiction had no moral weight of its own.125
Although many states had equipopulosity requirements for elec
toral districts, as the nation grew some states sacrificed equal
populosity in order to achieve other goals such as the representa
tion of existing subdivisions and regional interests, and after the en
franchisement of African Americans, the division or dilution of the
vote based on race.
122. See Konvitz, supra note 69, at 6.
123. See SACK, supra note 23, at 149; D. Lutz, The Theory of Consent in Early State
Constitutions, 9 PUBLIUS 11, 25 (1979).
124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among
the several states . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . . The actual Enumeration
shall be made . . . within every subsequent Term of ten Years.").
125. See Gerald E. Frug, The City
(1980).

as

a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1076
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At times, these goals led decision makers to produce electoral

districts

of radically

unequal

size.

In

the

companion

cases

Westberry v. Sanders126 and Reynolds v. Simms, 127 the Court held

that at least roughly equipopulous congressional districts were re

quired by Article I, section 2 and by the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Four years later, in Avery

v. Midland
County, 128 the Court held that the equipopulosity requirement ap

plied to elections held for general purpose municipal governments.
And in Board of Estimate

v. Morris, 129 the Court reinforced its ear

lier holding, striking down the legislative body that had served the

five boroughs of New York City since its incorporation on the

ground that its members were elected from jurisdictions of unequal

population.

Board ofEstimate v. Morris, one of the latest in the line of "one

person, one-vote" Supreme Court decisions, is also the most strik

ing example of the judicial embrace of what one might call the syn
thetic jurisdictional grid.

From

1907

-

nine years after the

incorporation of New York City - until its Court-ordered demise
in

1989,

the B oard of Estimate served as the primary legislative

body in New York City. The Board of Estimate reflected an or

ganic conception of borough jurisdiction. Composed of one mem

ber elected from each borough and three city-wide members, it
allowed each borough member an equally weighted vote, regardless

of the population of the borough.

Morris effectively mandated the

transformation of greater New York City, from a metropolitan con
federation government that institutionalized the uniqueness of its

five constituent boroughs, to a fully consolidated municipality in

which the boroughs were reduced to inconsequential units of
convenience.

These decisions illustrate the synthetic conception of jurisdic

tion. In each instance, an organic conception of jurisdiction would

have justified representative jurisdictions of unequal size. Organic
social groups may vary in size but deserve equal representation as

groups. Yet in each instance, the Court decided to sacrifice the no

tion of organic group representation in favor of individually ori
ented regularization. These decisions rejected the idea that groups

of unequal population may deserve representation on equal footing
as

groups. They subordinated group representation through or-

126.
127.
128.
129.

376 U.S. 1 (1964).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
390 U.S. 474 (1968).
489 U.S. 688 (1989).
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viduals through convenient jurisdictions.
This would seem to be strong evidence for the centralization
narrative. Arguably, one important consequence of the centraliza
tion of power is the destruction of sub-national affiliations that
might interfere with fostering national patriotism and the needs of a
national economy. The synthetic mode of jurisdictional formation
reflected in reapportionment requires citizens to express their polit
ical concerns and ambitions in terms of the isolated and autono
mous subject.

Activity as a member of an enduring political

community or group and even long-term alliances are fractured by
arbitrary borders that may be periodically redrawn . No affiliation
is so important that it cannot be destroyed in the next reapportion
ment. Although it is occasionally recognized that groups, not indi
viduals, elect representatives and influence public policy,130 the
synthetic mode of jurisdictional formation endeavors to render such
groups transitory, ephemeral and random. It seeks to reduce polit
ical groups and group-based identification with territory to episodic
occurrences or instrumental tactics.
In this sense, the synthetic jurisdiction constructs a particular
type of political subjectivity: a subject whose primary affiliations
are either much smaller or much larger tlian the local community.

It

encourages privatism - the inward-looking orientation toward

self, home and immediate family - and nationalism - the
broader-looking affiliation with the nation. The nation, then, is the
political entity that the synthetic mode insists is of primary impor
tance. In short, the synthetic mode discourages affiliations that in
termediate between the individual (or family) and the state.131
Moreover, the synthetic jurisdiction regularizes the relationship be
tween individuals and the central government. By insisting that
each jurisdiction is morally equivalent, the synthetic mode facilities
a regular and mechanical administration of policy that need not
consider the specifics of community or place.
The "one-person, one-vote" rule reflected more than a simple
vindication of liberal individualism. It also formalized a strictly syn
thetic conception of representative jurisdictions, the doctrinal coun
terpart of a regimented jurisdictional grid.
Evidence of governmental centralization is also found in the his
tory of "general purpose" jurisdictions, such as the states and local

130. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
131. Accord Frug, supra note 125, at 1076, 1089.
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governments. From the beginning, many American colonies were
synthetic jurisdictions, defined by abstract, metrical space. For in
stance, "[t]he first charter of Virginia . . . established a jurisdiction
over a territory carved out by lines of latitude, between 34° and 45°
North and up to

100

miles off shore."132 Other American charters

were similarly abstract in their definition of territory. Although
many charters allowed for experimentation and flexibility in the
creation of jurisdictional subdivisions (often granting the founder
absolute power to subdivide as he saw fit), others established elabo
rate jurisdictional schemes that mapped out subdivisions on paper
before a single colonist had set foot in the territory.133 For exam
ple, the

1669 plan for Carolina134 anticipated the revolutionary sub

division of France in its almost mathematical conceptualization:

The whole province shall be divided into counties; [forming squares]
each county shall consist of eight signiories, eight baronies, and four
precincts; [and] each precinct shall consist of six colonies . . . . Each
signiory, barony, and colony shall consist of twelve thousand acres . . .
so that in setting out and planting the lands, the balance of the gov
ernment may be preserved.135
Such a comprehensive jurisdictional blueprint was not the only
possible way to delegate political power. One might have waited
for actual settlements and empowered them as jurisdictions as they
emerged and grew. In fact, other colonial jurisdictions did emerge
in response to organic social settlement. Early New England towns,
for instance, were closed societies, often comprised of a single reli
gious group. "The New England town was a parish with civil au
thority grafted on. "136

Town lands belonged initially to the

founding settlers, and newcomers had to be approved by the
townsmen before they could settle in the community and hold land.
Some towns required that local magistrates approve new settlers,
others required the blessing of the Church. Most early New Eng
land towns forbade the sale of land to unapproved outsiders. In

1636, Boston enacted regulations limiting the

stay of guests to four

teen days unless leave to remain was thereafter granted by local
officials.137 These requirements were designed to police the mem132. SACK, supra note 23, at 134.
133. See id. at 134-38.
134. The plan was possibly drafted by John Locke. See id. at 136.
135. 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 0TIIBR
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 2772 (F.N Thorpe ed., 1909), quoted in SACK, supra
note 23, at 136 (final alteration added).
136. SACK, S11pra note 23, at 140.
137. See id. at 141.
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bership in an organic community. Local groups wished to exclude
individuals with incompatible beliefs and limit local charity to insid
ers.138 Accordingly, membership was presumed denied unless ex
pressly granted.
As the population of New England grew larger and more mo
bile, this insular system of local membership became unworkable.

In order to provide social services for a mobile population and to
spread the burdens of poverty relief, local governments established
a presumption in favor of permanent residency for individuals set
tled in the community for three months.

Those individuals not

"warned out" - discovered and expelled or found to be nuisance
- would become permanent community members. This presump
tion was maintained and strengthened in the
federation,139

1672 Articles of Con

and eventually matured into the

contemporary

constitutional "right to travel" standard which eliminated dura
tional residency requirements altogether for the receipt of local
benefits and exercise of the franchise.140 This evolution away from
local control over residency reflects a profound shift away from a
conception of organic, concrete, associational jurisdictions to one of
synthetic, abstract, convenient jurisdictions whose function is pri
marily to provide a generic set of services to a mobile population.
The subsequent evolution of American local government law
only continued the trend.141 In the early twentieth century, the
American legal theorist John Dillon advocated a synthetic concep
tion of local government.142 For Dillon, local governments were the
convenient agents of state power, they had no status independent of
the states of which they were a part. A state could "erect, change,
divide, and even abolish [municipal corporations], at pleasure, as it
deems the public good to require."143 Against Dillon, others ar
gued for a right to local self government based on the pre-legisla138. See id. at 141-42.
139. See id. at 142.
140. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating state law
requiring one year's residence in a county for eligibility for nonemergency indigent medical
care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating state law requiring three months
residence for exercise of the franchise in county election); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (invalidating state law that limited welfare benefits to those residing in jurisdiction for
at least one year).
141. I owe this description of the evolution of Dillon's Rule to Gerald Frog. See Frog,
supra note 125, at 1109-15.
142. John Dillon was the author of the first treatise on local government law and of the
now canonical "Dillon's Rule" which calls for strict construction of local government charter
powers. See JOHN DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872).
143. Id. § 30, at 72.
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tive status of ·· local governments as organic communities and
voluntary associations. They asserted that "local self-government
does not owe its origin to constitutions and laws . . . . [I]t is a part of
the liberty of community, an expression of community freedom, the
heart of our political institutions. "144
Dillon won. In 1907 the Supreme Court in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh145 held that the federal Constitution provided no protec
tion for local autonomy and no right to local self-government:

Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental pow
ers . . . as may be entrusted to them. . . . The state, therefore, at its
pleasure, may modify or withdraw all [local] powers, may take with
out compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agen
cies, expand or contract the territorial area . . . repeal the charter and
destroy the corporation. All this may be done . . . with or without the
consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.146
Although the debate continued for several years, by

1912

the syn

thetic nature of local government advocated by Dillon was, "so well
recognized that it [was] not . . . open to question."147

2.

The Return of the Repressed: Organic Jurisdiction in
American Government

As we have seen, the history of American jurisdictions was, in
many ways, the history of the centralization of power and the assim
ilation of difference. But the organic conception of local jurisdic
tions did not die. Instead it receded, only to emerge again in a
mutated and resistant form. As early as the late nineteenth cen
tury, the advocates of local autonomy advanced amendments to
state constitutions designed to protect localities from intrusive state
legislatures.148 The "home rule" movement attempted to provide
localities with a state law guarantee of the right to self government
that was rejected as a matter of federal constitutional law in
Hunter.149 Moreover, while the formal federal constitutional status
of local governments remains that articulated in Hunter, localities
have secured significant federal constitutional protection against
federal and state level intrusion through seemingly inconsequential
144. 1 EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 268, at 680-81
(2d ed. 1928).
145. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
146. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79.
147. WILLIAM B. MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIES 53 (1912).
148. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF TIIE
UNITED STATES 150 (1985); Frug, supra note 125, at 1116-17.
149. See Frug, supra note 125, at 1116-17.
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but actually dispositive dicta150 and through tangentially related
constitutional doctrines such as the private right to association .151
As Part III will demonstrate, the organic jurisdiction has been of
pivotal importance in American political and social life.

ill.

JURISDICTION AS COVERT STATUS: IDEOLOGY
AND HIERARCHY

I suggest that we think of liberalism as a certain way of drawing the
map of the social and political world. The old, preliberal map showed
a largely undifferentiated land mass, with . . . no borders. . . . Society
was conceived as an organic and integrated whole . . . . Confronting
this world, liberal theorists . . . drew lines, marked off different realms,
and created the sociopolitical map with which we are still familiar. . . .
Liberalism is a world of walls, and each one creates a new liberty.152

The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that
were egalitarian in principle was supported . . . by all those systems of
micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical
that we call the disciplines. . . . The 'Enlightenment,' which discovered
the liberties, also invented the disciplines.153
Territorial jurisdiction is a foundational technology of political
liberalism.

It defines one of two essential units or

"selves" of liber

alism. The liberal concept of "self-government" collapses the for
mal power of a group

(perhaps a "community") to control

government with the marginal power of an individual to influence
government: the two sovereign selves are the atomistic self of the
individual and the communal self of civil society. Liberalism di
vides the royal body of medieval political theology in two: in the
myth of Arthur, "the land and the King are one." In modem liberal
150. The most obvious example of such "stealth doctrine" is the consistent valorization of
local control of public schools. Although local governments continue to be arms of the states
as a matter of explicit constitutional law, they !ire implicitly semi-autonomous jurisdictions
whose interest in self government can override the protection of constitutional rights of equal
protection. See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries ofRace: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1841, 1875-76 (1994) [hereinafter Ford, The Boundaries ofRace]
(discussing the tacit support for local autonomy in school desegregation case and school fi
nancing); Richard T. Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Fonnation and Race
Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1382-83 (1997) [hereinafter Ford, Geography and Sover
eignty] (discussing same in a different context); Joan Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerabil
ity ofAmerican Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L.
REv. 83, 110 (describing the emergence of a "quasi-constitutional principle of local
sovereignty").
151. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
152. Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12/3 PoL. THEORY 315, 315
(1984).
153. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 222
(1979).

Michigan Law Review

898

(Vol. 97:843

ideology the body of the individual citizen is distinct from, but mir
rored by, the body politic.
Just as liberal institutions such as individual rights help to define
the boundaries of the liberal citizen, so the institutions of jurisdic
tion define the body politic. These walls of liberalism do in fact
define liberty, but they do much more than this - they create the
very entity that is to enjoy liberty. Both individual rights and the
formal rules of jurisdiction are "technologies of the self"; they are
discourses and concrete acts that define political selfhood and pro
vide the model for biological individuals to "perform themselves"
as (autonomous, rational, profit-maximizing, god fearing, desiring,
willful, raced, sexed) selves.
This very process of self construction also facilitates, perhaps
even requires, the covert, insidious side of the Enlightenment pro
ject: the institution of discipline. Like liberty, discipline also de
fines the self, but discipline defines informally. By conditioning
behavior, it produces self identity through habituation. For exam
ple, recall the Tango analogy introduced earlier in this Article. The
individual has a formal liberty to dance in any position or not to
dance at all. This liberty partially defines the individual as free and
self-made. But the individual is also disciplined and conditioned to
accept the position to which her gender corresponds. The Tango
imposes no formal injunction, but the process of self definition the definition of the self, but not entirely by herself - occurs
nevertheless.
Through both liberty and discipline a "wall" is built to define
the individual and shape her behavior. Liberty and discipline both
contain elements of "choice" and of "coercion." The walls that de
fine the subject create liberties and also facilitate social disciplines.

In this way, the jurisdictional art of separation simultaneously cre
ates "the liberties [and] . . . the disciplines."
A.

Jurisdiction

as

the Production of Political Subjectivity

Territorial sovereignty defines peoples' political identities as citizens
and forms the basis on which states claim authority over people and
resources within those boundaries. . . . [And] modern states have in
creasingly turned to territorial strategies to control what people can
do inside national boundaries. 154
The foregoing pages amply support the proposition that jurisdic
tion is a tool of government. Jurisdiction was developed for the
154. Vandergeest & Peluso, supra note 40, at 385.
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purposes of nation-building, for the coordination of governmental
proj ects in geographically disparate areas, for the collection and or
ganization of data, and for the legitimation of public policy. Yet
governments need more than jurisdictions. They also need citizens:
people who understand themselves as connected to governmental
institutions in specific ways. Territorial jurisdiction functions to
produce such citizen-subjects by encouraging people to behave and
to think of themselves in particular ways and discouraging other
modes of behavior and self-knowledge.

Territorial jurisdictions construct political subjectivity. The or
ganic description constructs political subjects who understand
themselves as - and in this sense in fact

are

-

intimately con

nected in groups that are defended by territorial autonomy. This
discourse encourages individuals and groups to present themselves
as organically connected to other people and to territory in a way
that requires jurisdictional autonomy.

It

requires that citizens as

sert, emphasize and even exaggerate their organic connections if

they are to present a compelling claim for the creation and protec

tion of their jurisdiction. The synthetic description, by contrast, en
courages citizens to understand themselves as rational, highly
mobile, modem individuals whose connections to land are instru
mental and fungible. Legal discourse to some extent

creates these

dialogically opposed modes of human selfhood, such that an attack
on a given jurisdictional arrangement can become an attack on the
very subjectivity of the individuals who are invested in that
arrangement.155
The relationships so created are relationships of political status.
Political theorists traditionally view status relationships as antitheti
cal to liberal society; the displacement of status relationships by
contractual relationships is a defining feature of political liberalism
in particular and modernity in general.156 But territorial identities
serve as new types of status. They come with a set of rights and
responsibilities that cannot be well understood as either voluntary
or natural. To take an extreme but illustrative example, we do not
believe that blacks living in the Jim Crow south volunteered for
155. This personhood type claim is evident, for instance, in Board of Education ofKiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), in which the assertion that Satmar
children were persecuted in majority Gentile schools was considered strong evidence in favor
of the claim for a separate jurisdiction. It is no less powerfully evident in cases such as San
Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the normative principle of
"local control" was invoked to defeat an equal protection attack on the unequal distribution
of public resources.
156. The classic assertion of this idea comes from Sir Henry Maine. See generally MAINE,
supra note 6.

Michigan Law Review

900

[Vol.

97:843

their subordinate condition "by choosing to live within the area of
its authoritative application."157 Nor, to take a contemporary ex
ample, is it plausible to describe the jurisdictionally wrapped bundle
of inferior public services and high taxes that confront the ghetto
poor as chosen. Even middle-class suburbanites only nominally
choose the consequences of their residency in a jurisdiction. In
tight housing markets people take what they can find and afford,
while in weak housing markets people scramble for property that
will hold its value. These economic constraints are overwhelming
for most people.
Nor are the attributes of jurisdictional residence "natural." No
particular set of rights and responsibilities naturally comes with res
idence in a given territory, and the boundaries of the territory itself
are not natural.158
The closest analogy to this type of "covert status" relationship is
the contemporary nuclear family. Family relationships are gener
ally presented as either voluntary contracts (marriage and adop
tion) or as natural and prepolitical (the "biological" bond between
parent and child). Yet neither of these descriptions is satisfactory.
Marriage has historically been a relationship of status. It continues
157.
158.

Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa,

439 U.S. 60, 82 {1978)

(Brennan, J., dissenting).

Three possible objections to my characterization of jurisdiction as status are worthy
of note. First, perhaps not only jurisdictional relationships, but all social relationships in soci
eties with entrenched social hierarchies are characterized by unwanted bundling. For in
stance, not only the home in a segregated jurisdiction, but also the lunch at a segregated
counter must be understood as unwanted bundling. If I want the house, or the lunch, I have
to take the segregation and the stigma. The critical point, however, is that jurisdictional
statuses supplement or even replace many of the more overt types of status. In contempo
rary American social policy, one notion that justifies a good deal of illegitimate social hierar
chy is that people choose their circumstances by moving to a particular jurisdiction. Through
jurisdictional fragmentation, formally neutral laws can easily produce entrenched social hier
archy. See, e.g., Ford, The Boundaries of Race, supra note 150, at 1849-52.
Second, one may argue that bundling is not unique to jurisdictional relationships but is
characteristic of many contractual relationships. For instance, markets are regularly charac
terized by captive submarkets. If I want the ball game or the movie I have to accept being
captive to the lousy concession stand, etc. I would argue that the extent of bundling that
occurs in jurisdictions is far greater than that in most other markets.
Fmally, one could argue that the factor that accounts for increased bundling is, again, not
jurisdiction, but land in general. Here one might argue that the natural spatial constraints of
distance and proximity make bundling inevitable. If I want the house I have to take the
easement or the covenant because the only way my neighbor can get the bundle he wants is
for me to be stuck with the corresponding obligations. This objection does not undermine
my larger point. Jurisdiction evolved from property relationships and so it is not surprising
that the two bear a family resemblance. See discussion of Maine, supra section II.B. I do not
wish to argue for a sharp distinction between jurisdiction and other territorial relationships
that implicate governmental power (as property relationships undeniably do, see, e.g., Morris
R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CoRNELL L.Q. 8, 11-14 {1927) (recognizing private
property rights as a form of sovereignty)). In fact, this Article has explicitly argued that
jurisdiction is a social practice that involves both public and private institutions. See supra
section II.C.
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to be so at least to the extent that many terms of the standard ar
rangement are nonwaivable or intentionally made very difficult to
waive. The traditional marriage imposed gendered positions within
a hierarchy that could not be bargained around. And today, the
marriage relationship is not a contract that any two otherwise com
petent parties can adopt. The status of spouse is unavailable to
those who choose a partner of the same sex; those who wish to at
tain the status of spouse are required to choose a partner of a differ
ent sex.
Nor can the most important legal consequences of parenthood
be explained by the bare fact of biological connection. There is
nothing natural about the presumption that biological parents have
custody over their offspring even against the will of the offspring
themselves. Indeed the very notion of custody seems derived from
a property relationship that is thoroughly . legally constructed.
There is nothing natural about the right of parents to control the
religious and ideological upbringing of their children even against
the wishes of neighbors, local communities and society at large indeed such a right was probably unthinkable in the close .knit com
munities that characterized most of human civilization until quite
recently.
Likewise, the status of resident comes with a host of nonwaiv
able terms. Like marriage, it can be withheld depending on one's
choice of personal associations.159 And like the parent/child rela
tionship, few of the legal implications of residence follow naturally
from "the facts" - in this case physical presence or domicile in the

jurisdiction.160

1. From the Great Strategies of Geo-Politics to the Little Tactics
of the Habitat
Of course jurisdiction, unlike the family, is a public institution.
But many jurisdictions produce seemingly private social identities.
Because American society was historically dominated by private so
cial institutions, the development of American jurisdictions took on
159. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 9 (1974) (upholding local ordi
nance that prohibits cohabitation by more than two person not related by blood, adoption or
marriage).
160. For example, because one lives in a jurisdiction, it does not follow that one should
have to support the education of children in that jurisdiction, and only children in that juris
diction. If the rationale is that residents will benefit from an educated population, such a
benefit does not logically begin or end at the boundaries of the jurisdiction. If the rationale is
a more general moral obligation as a member of a political community, then it is unclear why
the obligation should end at the "necessarily arbitrary" borders of the local jurisdiction,
rather than extending to the nation as a whole, or even beyond.
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what we would today consider a distinctly private cast. This privat
ism - the promotion of individual mobility and contractual/market
relationships - complemented the creation of territorial statuses.
Private social groups used jurisdiction in order to maintain status
hierarchies based on race and national origin, and because the
groups were not a part of a formal state apparatus, the practices
were defended as free association and the exercise of the right of
contract.161 But governmental bureaucracies were actively involved
in the creation of new jurisdictionally defined statuses. Govern
ment encouraged and facilitated the nominally private actions and
expertly catalogued the social demographics that resulted. For ex
ample, federally subsidized home mortgages encouraged and even
required homeowners to enter into racially restrictive real cove
nants. Federal officials catalogued neighborhoods according to
their racial composition as part of an explicit policy to prohibit the
use of mortgage subsidies in black or integrated neighborhoods.162
Both the formal state and private social groups acted in concert
as "government" in this respect. Not only did private actors draw
on the power of the state to enforce status hierarchies through con
tract and property, but-more importantly perhaps-private actors
and state institutions acted in tacit collusion to perpetuate a racial/
territorial status hierarchy. Private actors supplied the content that
would have been constitutionally impermissible if developed by the
state, while the state supplied the coercive force of law, unavailable
to private individuals. Therefore, rather than discuss the state de
fined in opposition to civil society, I will proceed with an analysis of
government, understood to include both public and private actors
that have a formal legal status or systematically exercise state de
rived power.
We could think of a continuum between larger and smaller terri
torial institutions, with the family at one pole and the nation-state

161. Racially restrictive zoning practices were constitutional until the landmark decision
in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). After that, private restrictive covenants were
quietly encouraged by the federal, state and local government as an effective substitute and
remained so at least until 1948, when they too were struck down in Shelly v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948). Incorporation of new municipalities also served to promote status segregation
and hierarchy. See JACKSON, supra note 148, at 150·51 (asserting that the desire to avoid
recent immigrants in the inner cities was one of the most important motivations for suburban
incorporation); Richard F. Muth, The Causes ofHousing Segregation, in IssuES IN Hous1No
D1scRIM1NATION 3, 8 (1986) (noting the importance of restrictive zoning in "maintain[ing]
segregation of suburban areas").
162. See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN Hous.
ING 229-37 (1955).
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at the other. Understood as government,163 these institutions are
homologous and continuous rather than sharply divided:

[W]hereas the doctrine of the prince and the juridical theory of sover
eignty are constantly attempting to draw the line between the power
of the prince and any other form of power . . . [it is] the art of govern
ment . . . to establish a continuity . . . . [A] person who wishes to
govern the state well must first learn how to govern himself, his goods
and his patrimony . . . . [and] when a state is well run, the head of the
family will know how to look after his family, his goods and his patri
mony . . . . [T]he central term of this continuity is the government of
the family, termed economy. 164
Hence the jurisdictional plan of straight-sided territories estab
lished for the Western states mirrored the grid created for govern
mental homestead land grants and the gridiron plan of the
American metropolis. Similarly, the identity of blood and race es
tablished in the family, the private identity of local membership and
the public identity of national citizenship ar� continuous. Each is
accomplished through a blend of voluntary and involuntary rela
tions, each is anchored in a territory - home, locality, nation 163. There is a risk that this use of the term "government" can slip into tautology. If
government is understood too broadly, to become synonymous- with "culture" or "society,"
then the assertion that "government mirrors society" becomes: "society mirrors itself." On
the other hand, government in Foucault's sense denotes more than the formal institutions of
the state. Foucault means to describe a broader set of institutions - of which those of the
formal state may not even be· the most important - that all operate in similar ways to pro
duce a similar form of social control, discipline and organization. Foucault's most consistent
examples are the school, the prison, the criminal justice system, the medical clinic, the mili
tary and the family. Each of these institutions encourages a particular type of regimentation,
of which we consider the military and the prison to be paradigmatic. To take only one exam
ple, behavioral control is established through routine, repetition and surveillance. Social rit
ual is taught nightly at the family dinner table ("use the correct fork"); school teaches
children through drills and repetitive exercises; both the prison and the military regiment
daily activity to "reform" or "remake" the rank and file; even medical therapy generally
involves establishing physical or mental routines. Each of these social practices is designed to
produce and instill normal and habitual behavior - the prescribed activity becomes "second
nature." See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 153; MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE
CLINIC (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1973) (1963).
At this point, a brief discussion of "structuralism" is relevant. "Governmentality" could
be interpreted as "deep structure" that lies beneath the institutions it describes. One might
read Foucault to mean that the "logic" of governmentality secretly informs all institutions of
the society, in each case producing the same inevitable result. This interpretation, while plau
sible, is unnecessary. Various institutions that operate in a given society or milieu may bor
row techniques and practices from each other and may build on the techniques and practices
of each other. For instance, the aircraft industry of World War II borrowed assembly line
techniques from Ford Motors and thereby also produced workers who were good at assembly
line work and who understood the division of labor. This in turn made other businesses more
likely to model their practice on the division of labor. We may call this mode of production
"Fordism." Nothing in this narrative suggests a "deep structure," but it does suggest more
than coincidence or uncoordinated individual choices and something other than what we
normally understand as coercion.
164. Michel Foucault, Govemmentality, in THE FoucAULT EFFECT 87, 91-92 (Graham
Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
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and each is inexorably linked to a type of government - head of
household, territorial local government, national sovereignty.

2. Residence and Domicile: The Metaphysics of
Territorial Presence
All well and good, one may respond, but an institution like the
family is primarily concerned with personal membership or status
- territory is of secondary importance. In the case of public insti
tutions this priority is reversed. Governments are defined by terri
tory - personal membership is a side-effect of territorial dominion.
Governments simply govern whoever happens into their territory.
On this view, jurisdiction is a simple relationship between gov
ernment and physical territory: the goal of jurisdiction would be to
establish dominion over a particular physical space. But this expla
nation, while partially accurate, is incomplete. Jurisdiction in fact
defines a relationship between the government and individuals, me
diated by space. Territory acts as a medium of governmental power
as well as its primary object. Territory is, in this sense, a container
that holds a bundle of individuals and resources, just as fee simple
ownership of real property consists of a bundle of rights.
Moreover, the relationship between a territory and the individu
als and resources it "holds" is not a natural or necessary correspon
dence.

It is not

a relationship of empirical fact but one of positive

design. The first year student of property law learns that a subter
ranean gas reservoir "belongs" to a given piece of property only
due to a set of contingent legal rules. The resources can be severed
from ownership of the land on the surface and its status as property
may depend on factors other than the status of the land immedi
ately above it.
The contingency of the relationship between individuals and ter
ritory is much more pronounced.

Individuals move more easily

than most subterranean resources. An individual may occupy sev
eral cities within the course of a day and own property in several
states or nations or "do business" in a number of jurisdictions. The
assertion that an individual "belongs" to a particular jurisdiction for
a particular purpose relies on a host of potentially controversial
premises and arrives through scores of leaps of faith and logic.
In short, when we say that a particular resource or person is
"present" in a jurisdiction, we mean both more and less than physi
cal presence. It may be that the legally present individual is physi
cally absent (as in the case of the fugitive from justice or the
absentee voter), or that the physically present individual is legally
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absent (as in the case of the homeless person without formal domi
cile or the undocumented alien).
physical but

Jurisdictional presence is not

metaphysical. It is a relationship that refers to the

physical and is analogous to the physical, but is something other
than physical.
Legal presence does not simply follow from physical presence.
For instance, in the United States, for the purposes of taxation, vot
ing and access to most public services, the metaphysical presence at
issue is formally defined as domicile or residence. One is meta
physically present in the jurisdiction of her domicile, even when she
is actually walking the streets of a foreign city. Her presence in the
place of residence is real for legal purposes. The physical location
of her body is irrelevant. The notion of residence operates by anal
ogy to physical presence. We assume that people are usually at
home, that they care most about home, that they identify with
home, and therefore we "find" them at home for legal purposes,
even if they are physically somewhere else.

It is as if a New Yorker

were always in New York - where she resides - even when she is
physically in Los Angeles.
The principle that the franchise and many other local rights and
privileges may be limited to residents of a jurisdiction establishes a
jurisdictional status or identity. The theory of residence is premised
on a correspondence between residence and membership in a polit
ical community. But as a matter of political theory there is no rea
son that these two must correspond. The meaning of residence is
overdetermined. Residential presence may indicate a decision to
join a political community but it may also reflect a fungible invest
ment in property; it may reflect agreement with the values and pri
orities currently dominant in the jurisdiction or a desire to
intervene in changing those values and priorities.
Residence does not reflect natural connections between individ
uals, groups and territory. Nor does it simply formalize the volun
tary choices of autonomous individuals.

Instead, residence is a

concept that stabilizes, by fiat, a necessarily uneasy relationship be
tween mapped territories and an increasingly mobile and unknow
able population.

And it does more than this.

By tying the

individual to a stable referent - a fixed place - it creates for her a
political

identity that is only nominally chosen. The status of resi

dence requires the citizen to accept a limited number of jurisdic
tionally "bundled" rights and responsibilities. Moreover, it requires
the citizen to identify territorially, to define herself according to her
relationship to territory.
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The Jurisdiction of "Local Knowledge"

This section will explore the relationship between jurisdiction,
political subjectivity and the assertion of local particularity. Specifi
cally, it will respond in more detail to the belief that centralized
power is exercised primarily by repressing local differences in favor
of homogeneity and uniformity. It will argue that territorial power
is exercised not only through repression or exclusion of difference
and centralization, not only through homogenization or assimilation
to a mean, but also through the production of difference.
The argument of this section parallels that of Michel Foucault in
the classic The History of Sexuality: An lntroduction. 165 Foucault
argued against the common understanding that the institutions of
bourgeois society from the Victorian era to the present have oper
ated to repress the natural and authentic sexuality of individuals
(the "repressive hypothesis"). Instead, Foucault argued, the
Victorians were obsessed with sexuality, they saw it everywhere,
they constantly discussed it, insisted on its relevance and deployed
it as a description of many forms of human behavior. They pro
duced sexuality by defining human behavior in terms of sexuality,
defining individuals as sexed in various ways, and cataloguing and
constructing sexual typologies. Far from repression, this production
of sexuality was, according to Foucault, what defined the Victorian
attitude toward sex, and this production of sexuality was a means of
control. It was a technology that defined the self according to its
sexuality, and thereby kept individuals under a type of sexual sur
veillance. Further, if anything repressed authentic eroticism - a
term whose ontological status is, for Foucault, questionable at best
- it was the incessant production of sexuality that limited the pos
sibilities of erotic expression by imposing upon individual eroticism
a narrow universe of sexual types.
Now let us turn to jurisdiction. Contemporary discussions of
ethnic and cultural diversity characteristically involve a struggle be
tween "universalism" or "common values" on the one hand and
"cultural diversity" or "respect for difference" on the other. In the
national context, those who favor "universalism" - actually na
tionalism - lament the fracturing of the nation into antagonistic
factions, ethnic enclaves and oppositional subcultures.166 They ad
vocate a "return" to a common identity, a common purpose and a
165. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (1976).
166. See generally ETZIONI, supra note 116; JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE CULTURE
OF CONTENTMENT (1992); TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY
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common culture. By contrast, those who fear cultural homogeneity
insist that cultural differences reflect the true and authentic expres
sions of organic social groups and that failure to respect these dif
ferences is a form of tyranny.167

They advocate a strategy of

resistance to cultural hegemony through the assertion of difference.
When the question of political territoriality is introduced into
this debate, the consequences are predictable. Those in favor of
solidarity seek to prevent the formation of culturally defined juris
dictional subdivisions, wrongly imagining that such divisions would
be new and unprecedented and fearing that such divisions would
hasten the fracturing of the nation.168 Those who favor difference
embrace jurisdictional "autonomy" as a means of protecting minor
ity cultures from hegemonic oppression and compulsory
assimilation.169
In this conversation, the "repressive hypothesis" is that Power is
exercised exclusively by those who would censor and repress cul
tural difference and impose a unitary and repressive common cul
ture.

But the analytic mistake that underlies this repressive

hypothesis is shared by both sides of the debate. B oth sides assume
that there is an inevitable opposition between common identity and
the assertion of difference. The universalists argue that the myopic
assertion of difference stands between "us" and meaningful solidar
ity. Meanwhile, the champions of difference insist that the repres
sive project of solidarity must yield to respect for authentic cultural
difference.110
AMERICA Is WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995); MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN
NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1995).

167. In the more shrill version of this position one hears terms such as "cultural geno
cide" and "fascism" employed with disturbing obliviousness to their historical referents.
168. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (describing a North Carolina redistrict
ing plan as analogous to racial segregation); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910-12 (1995)
(striking down Georgia redistricting as racial gerrymandering).
169. See generally, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBE RALISM, COMMUNITY, AND
(1989) (arguing that liberalism requires the accommodation of certain culturally

CULTURE
distinctive

groups through the creation of separate territories).

170. This local repression hypothesis takes on many forms. For example the "new feder
alism" involving the resurgence of support for "state's rights" implicates siniilar concerns.
The supporters of expanded state autonomy argue for respect for state (and at times local)
cultures, while the opponents stress the need for common values and national coordination.
It is rarely noted that many of the strongest supporters of state's rights are members of the
federal legislature. Few of these supporters embrace state autonomy consistently. Instead,
they hope to reverse or block particular policies that are popular at the federal level - gun
control, abortion rights, civil rights, environmental protection - by shifting the relevant fo
rum to the state level. The supporters of national uniformity are no more consistent in this
regard. The same people who insist on national uniformity in the context of civil rights for
racial minorities will champion state's rights when it comes to gay marriages. Much of the
new federalism amounts to rhetorically sophisticated forum shopping. The debate over
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This section- will critique the uncritical embrace of difference
that characterizes a good deal of contemporary left or postmodern
multiculturalism.
One,

I

I focus on this side of the debate for two reasons.

am personally allied with left multiculturalism and sympa

thetic to many of its goals.

I hope

to advance those goals in some

small way by helping to defeat a bad strategy based on misconcep
tions, dogma and cant. Two,

I

hope that

I have

something new to

say about the fetishism of difference, while most of what

I would

say against the "universalistic" - usually covertly nationalist project (and

I

would say a good deal against it) has already been

quite well put by others, to whom

I

am greatly indebted.

The production of difference was and is often a critical part of
nationalist hegemony. Not only does nationalism require the well
chronicled production of differences among nation-states, but it
also requires the production of difference

within the national com

munity. As we have seen, internal local distinctiveness often pro

vides the cultural content that distinguishes one nation-state from
another; in many cases, the national culture is more or less the sum
of its local parts. Further, a nativist identity can be forged in oppo
sition to internal foes as easily as against external enemies. Na
tional institutions are built and strengthened on the basis of
reaction to internal sedition or cultural degeneration. History is full
of nationalist wars

against domestic enemies, both

real

and

imagined. As proof, one need only name the Star Chamber, the
Gulag, the House Committee on Un-American Activities. And as
D.W. Griffith's notorious film reveals, racial
midwife's role in the Birth of a Nation.111

division played the

These examples demonstrate that national hegemony is not in
consistent with the assertion of sub-national difference.

They

should shame those who, while advocating new projects of national
solidarity, blame the familiar racial or culturally defined victim for
national decline. They should also warn racial and culturally de
fined groups that the language of difference and autonomy may be
a trap.
The institution of jurisdiction does its most important work, not
by repressing local difference, but by producing it, by dividing soci

ety into distinctive local units that are imposed on individuals and

groups. The discourse of the organic jurisdiction encourages minor
ity groups to seek out territorial autonomy as a means to resist the
state's rights rhetorically pits national uniformity against state autonomy, but, practically
speaking, it concerns a number of ideological conflicts that cut across jurisdictional divisions.
171. THE BIRTH OF A NATION (David W. Griffith Corp. & Epoch Producing Corp. 1915).
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power of an often hostile government and the hegemony of the ma
jority culture. But separate territorial status rarely delivers on its
promise of autonomy.

Often, the subordinate group unwittingly

conspires in its own continued subordination and participates in its
own quarantine. A subordinate group may insist that it only wishes
to attain the type of "autonomy" that members of the majority en
joy. But the position of security that the dominant group enjoys
requires the subjugation of a subordinate group. No group can en
tirely control its own fate without also controlling other groups
around it. The coveted position in question is not autonomy, but

hegemony - a position that, by definition, everyone cannot occupy.
Autonomy is a false promise because it promises access to a space
outside of power, a safe haven from the threat of subjugation, con
trol or influence by outsiders. Such a space does not exist.

1.

The Centralization Hypothesis

It is often said that the history of modernity, the ideological -his
tory of something called "liberalism," is the history of centraliza
tion.172 According to this account, the modernist project was the
project of rationalization, universalism, uniformity, order. Neigh
borhood businesses and artisans' guilds gave way to national and
international conglomerates. Cottage industry gave way to econo
mies of scale and the Fordist division of labor.173 The clan yielded
place to the province, which in tum was supplanted by the nation
state.174 Landscapes and communities that were once varied and
opaque became regimente� and transparent to the eye of power:
the Norman Conquest unified the tribes of Eri.gland,175 B aron
Haussmann forced the labyrinth of medieval Paris to yield to the
Grand Avenues of the modem city of light.176
This account holds that the modem state struck out against local
culture and particularity in every possible respect. It imposed na
tional languages governed by uniform grammatical rules to smother
local dialects and idioms.177 It routinized the collection of taxes to
crush local fiefdoms and supplant provincial clientelism. It elimi
nated local territories in order to facilitate the smooth application
of justice and the free alienation of land. It prohibited the varie172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra note 116.
See DAVID HARVEY, THE CoNDmoN OF PosTMODERNITY 125-40 {1989).
See generally Anderson, supra note 79.
See supra section II.B.2.
See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 173, at 16-17.
See supra section II.B.l.
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gated customs of dispute resolution in favor of uniform justice and
universal rights. Each of these projects required centralization: a
single sovereign, a uniform standard of measure, a common tongue,
a common law. So the history of the modern era is the history of
the centralization of authority, of economy and of culture.

It is the

story of the birth of the universal everyman and the suppression of
the particular personality.

It is

the narrative of uniformity, homo

geneity, the celebration of the one and the censorship of difference.
This, anyway, has become the standard account of things in dis
ciplines as varied as human geography, ethnic studies and the his
tory of law.

It is an easy story to tell, if only because it coincides so

well with such a variety of ideological precommitments. For the
right, the death of localism is a product of the tyranny of intermed
dling government, a Frankenstein's creation of liberal social engi
neering that defined the New Deal, the Warren Court and the
Great Society. For the old left, the destruction of local particularity
is nothing other than a symptom of industrial capitalism: the cen
tralization of political authority serves the centralization of the
means of production; a uniform and fungible political subjectivity
follows the reduction of human labor to fungible capital and the
reduction of human needs to fungible commodities. Meanwhile,
the social movements of the new left lament an inexorable centrali
zation of power as the active repression of (counter) cultural differ
ence and subversive identities; Washington, D.C. represents the
repressive injunction to adopt the voice of "middle America" and
the establishment, to accept the disciplinary image of the "reason
able man," the men in gray suits, or simply, "the man."
Historically, modern cartography played a critical role in this
relentless governmental centralization:

"Cartography became in

separable from the affirmation of monarchic power . . . . The king
could now sit in his chamber and 'without troubling himself greatly,
see with his eye and touch with his finger' the expanse
of his territory - without having to travel at all."17s

and diversity

Diversity? But wasn't this diversity precisely what was wiped
out, crushed, assimilated? This passage suggests that centralization
tells only part of the story. Always buried within these narratives of
inexorable, unmediated, unmodified centralization, one finds a
glimpse of its opposite: an explosion of differentiation, the produc
tion of ever new categories that are represented as "merely descrip178. Jacques Revel, Knowledge of the Territory, 4 Sci. IN CONTEXT 133, 150-51 (1991)
(quoting R. HERvE, L'OEVRE CARTOGRAPHIQUE DE NICOLAS DE NICOLAY ET D'ANroINB
DE LAROL (1544-1619) {1956)) (emphasis added).
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tive" mappings. No doubt, there was a trend toward centralization
that characterized a significant program of modem government;
universalism was imposed, difference was punished and censored.
But there was also, and to a significant extent, the opposite phe
nomena: typology, sorting, differentiation to an ever more "pre
cise" and infinitesimal degree, a carving up into distinct parts. This
too is the legacy of modernity and of liberal democracy.
This paradoxical differentiation cannot be fully understood as
"resistance . " The point is not that the members of organic social
groups managed, by their tenacity, to cling to local customs despite
the imposition of the common law and central courts,179 it is not
that villages and provinces stubbornly continued to speak dialect in
the face of sanctions for failure to speak the language of the
state,180 it is not that villages and townships retained their unique
character in the face of urban consolidation. Alongside these well
acknowledged acts of resistance, but hidden in the shadows, was the
active production of localism, the creation of territorially structured
differentiation through the institutions of modem government: the
state, the corporation, the university and the jurisdiction.181
Thus it may be said that localism itself, localism in all of its par
ticularity and difference, was the child, rather than the enemy, of
the modem state.182

Alongside the well chronicled attempt to

stamp out local particularity, we also have the production, creation,
definition and interrogation of the local in its territorially located
specificity. "The local" as a concept, as a category, as a significant
object of concern, is the product of a governmental discourse whose
goal was to catalogue, define and manage a territory by dividing it
into knowable and distinct parts.

2. Localism

as

Discursive Effect

[The Great Khan owns an atlas where all the cities of the empire and
the neighboring realms are drawn]
"I think you recognize cities better on the atlas than when you
visit them in person," the emperor says to Marco, snapping the vol
ume shut.
And [Marco] Polo answers, "Traveling, you realize that differences
are lost: each city takes to resembling all cities, places exchange their
form, order, distances, a shapeless dust cloud invades the continents.
179. See supra section II.B.2.
180. See supra section II.B.1.
181. It is no accident that all of these institutions at one time answered to the same name:
corporation. See, e.g., RICHARD SENNETT, FLESH AND STONE 202-03 (1994).
182. Though to be sure children are known to rebel against their parents.
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Your atlas preserves the differences intact: that assortment of quali
ties which are like the letters in a name."183

It is true that the conditions of everyday life that are offered as
evidence of "local culture" existed chronologically prior to any in
quiry by a central government. But conceptually, these conditions
did not preexist government inquiry - they did not exist as objects
of study or interest. They were context and background, taken for
granted or simply ignored. Rather than the defining characteristics
of a localism that was celebrated or condemned, these conditions
were simply the conditions of existence for some group of people at
a given moment in time. They were facts, but facts without mean
ing in the absence of context. For instance, it is a "fact" that as I
write these words I am wearing a black suit, but this probably
"means" very little to you. If, on the other hand, you were to hy
pothesiZe that a black suit symbolized something, like "black
power," "post modernist artisto-symp," "reservoir dog," or "federal
agent," then the suit would have acquired meaning through your act
of interpretation. You might then write a magazine article about
"the real men in black" which would provide additional data:
"Cynical postmodern thirty-something technofetishist with a
penchant for mid-century modem design and style." My black suit
would have been transformed from a mere fact into a characteristic,
a fact imbued with social meaning that identifies or defines a social
group.
Although my black suit preexists the magazine article chrono
logically, the meaning of the suit as a uniform of the "real men in
black" does not preexist the media disquisition. I may well only
know my "community" through the media's construction. Sud
denly I "realize" that I wear a black suit, not because black is flat
tering and doesn't show coffee stains, but because I am a member
of a local culture that favors black suits. At that point, other "facts"
about my life might fall into a profile: a love of mid-century jazz
becomes part of a penchant for cultural and aesthetic modernism,
the Apple Powerbook that contains this Article becomes a symp
tom of technofetishism. Add a territorial classification, "these noir
clad neo-modernists hail from Northern California," and you have a
full blown local culture.184
183. lTALO CALVINO, lNvISIBLE CITIES 137 (1972).
184. Note that the local culture can absorb a wide range of new and even inconsistent
facts: smoking is a retro-hip affectation (rather than an addiction), not smoking demon
strates that one is "beyond hip" (rather than simply health conscious); ownership of a mobile
telephone is evidence of technophilia and links to the fast paced communications grid, non
ownership of the cell phone is evidence of a hyper cool disdain for technological overload, an
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This is "the discursive production of localism.'t: "'Discursive pro
duction" is different from "social production." Social production
simply means that the object of study is not naturally occurring but
is instead the product of a particular society. "1bile localism is so
cially produced, such an observation is uninteresting - no one
thinks otherwise. "Discursive p_roduction" denotes something
more: that localism generally - the idea of localism, and any given
local "culture" or locality - may be an artifact of some observer
who identifies it, records it and interrogates it for some purpose of
the observer's. Localism on this account is not itself an attri�ute,
but is instead a process, a process that turns a set of attributes into
characteristics of a type, elements in a taxonomy.185 The represen
tational medium through which governments record and categorize
locality is the map; the legal mechanism by which governments cre
ate and manage locality is the political jurisdiction.
C.

Racism's Borders: Jurisdiction

as

Social Quarantine

"Good racial government" . . . requires information about racial na
ture: about character and culture, history and traditions,, that is,
about the limits of the Other's possibilities. . . . [The Other] may be
employed but only as informant . . . . The spaces of the Other - the
colonies, plantations, reservations, puppet governments and client
states, the villages and townships, or the prisons, ganglands, ghettoes,
and crowded inner cities - become the laboratory in which these epis
temological constructs may be tested. . . . Knowledge, accordingly, is
socially managed. . . .186
The organic jurisdiction appears to recognize the uniqueness of
various social groups, and their connection to a: �erritorial home
land, a sphere of cultural belonging, a place. This has led many to
celebrate the construction of organic jurisdictions and to articulate
claims for social justice in terms of separation and jurisdictional auaesthetic decision to simplify one's lifestyle, a super-elite nonchalance ("someone else han
dles your calls") rather than a limited budget.
185. Michel Foucault makes a similar point regarding the social sciences in general using
the "Chinese Encyclopredia" of Borges's imagination, in which "animals are divided into: (a)
belonging to the Emperor, {b) embali:ned, (c) tame, {d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous,
{g) stray dogs, {h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, G) innumerable, {k)
drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, {m) having just broken the water pitcher,
(n) that from along way off look like flies." MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS xv
{1973). The simple point is that such a taxonomy, so different from any that we recognize as
logical, could, in a vastly different 'social milieu, exist. The categories, although strange, are
"true" - they "can be assigned a precise meaning and a demonstrable content . . . What
transgresses the boundaries of all imagination, of all possible thought, is simply that alphabet
ical series . . . which links each of those categories to all the others." Id. at xv-xvi.
186. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CuLTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE PoLmcs OF
MEANING 150-51 {1993) (emphasis added).
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tonomy. Even in the highly urban, industrialized and culturally pol
yglot societies of the Western capitalist democracies, the assertion
of organic cultural community is appealing. Evoking a fairly direct
analogy to a historical or mythical homeland or place of origin, the
desire for a safe space of jurisdictional autonomy resonates with the
often understandable desire for cultural nationalism and ethnic
autarchy.
But the organic jurisdiction can be as much the product of cen
tralized power as the synthetic: each serves a unique purpose in the
structure of government. Organic jurisdiction divides society into
groups that need no further justification. The explanation for the
character of the group may be nature, culture or voluntarism, but
the effect is to justify the uneven treatment of individuals by the
state.

1.

The Jurisdiction of Apartheid

The most notorious example of the oppressive production of dif
ference is the apartheid of mid- to late-twentieth century South Af
rica (what I will call "late apartheid," to separate it from the cruder
policies of the earlier twentieth-century regime).187 What separates
late apartheid from the Jim Crow laws of the American South is the
intricacy of the former in both the architecture of the physical sepa
ration and its legitimation. In both its material and its ideological
aspects, the separatist regime of South Africa was as marked an
advance over American Jim Crow as the gas chamber is over the
hangman's noose. These "advances" were primarily the result of
jurisdictional production. In both its material and ideological ef
fects, late apartheid marked a conspicuous expansion of jurisdic
tional strategies.
The pass laws that enforced a rigorous separation between white
urban areas and black shanty towns are the globally notorious sym
bols of apartheid. More insidious was the elaborate system of eth
nic homelands created by the South African government. These
homelands or

bantustans were both a material and an ideological

program. The bantustans marked the formalization of South Afri
can racism and its translation into the language of natural "recogni-

187. It bears noting that the South African government did not itself refer to its new,
improved version of racial separatism as "apartheid" but rather, in the manner of any good
marketer, coined new terms for its noxious product: "separate development," "multination
alism," and the strikingly disingenuous "self-determination." See Anne McC!intock & Rob
Nixon, No Names Apart: The Separation of Word and History in Derrida's "Le Dernier Mot
du Racisme," in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 339, 341 (Henry Louis Gates Jr. ed.,
1986) (an excellent essay in its own right, but a failure as a response to Derrida).
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bantustan policy effected

the expulsion of black South Africans from developed urban areas
- except on limited terms of benefit to whites - and from some
eighty-seven percent of all land in the nation, including all of the
most fertile and mineral rich property.188 Black "citizenship" was
imposed in the bantustans, with the logical consequence that blacks
were stripped of the rights of citizens in the newly constructed
white South Africa:

As the Minister of Bantu Development put it in a 1978 speech: "if
our policy is taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black
people are concerned, there will not be one black man with South
African citizenship." Since 1960, the government has forcibly reset
tled 3.5 million Africans and effectively deprived 8 million of their
citizenship by means of statutes carefully worded to avoid defining
citizenship on racial grounds.1 89
Ideologically, late apartheid functioned by naturalizing racial
difference and segregation.

It

accomplished this through the con

struction of a knowledge of the local. The homelands were both
synthetic and organic jurisdictions:

the Nationalist government

deployed the technology of jurisdiction to

create a set of "natural"

territorial tribal divisions within the nation-state. Late apartheid
marshaled a regulatory apparatus that was necessarily also a statis
tical apparatus, a social scientific apparatus and a cartographic ap
paratus. The apartheid state struggled to study, know, catalogue
and map the races. This effort culminated in the construction of
separate jurisdictional spaces that appeared to be their own
justification.
The ethnic bantustans, comprised of eighty-one scattered home
lands, entrenched, expanded and justified apartheid. Now forced
segregation was rhetorically transformed into respect for difference.
The domination of the few became a democratic confederacy:

[T]he bantustan system . . . serv[ed] the ideological purpose of justify
ing Nationalist claims that their policy is no longer one of racial dis
crimination but of safeguarding the sovereignty of distinct "nations."
. . . By pointing to the ten bantustans, the government can claim that
"numerically the White nation is superior to all other nations in South
Africa. . . . It demonstrates the folly of saying that a minority govern
ment is ruling others in South Africa."190
In late apartheid South Africa, each tribal nation was recognized,
even celebrated, for its distinctiveness.
188. See id. at 348.
189. Id. at 350 (internal citations omitted).
190. Id. at 351 (final alteration in original).
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Apartheid's use of the organic jurisdiction was not designed pri
marily to separate or even to exclude blacks from white South Af
rica.

Blacks entered white areas on a daily basis in order to

perform manual labor. The effect of the organic discourse was not
to exclude, but to define and control. The claim was not that the
bantustans were separate nation-states, but that they were separate
nations

within one state: the state of South Africa. They were or

gans of the state. The organic nationalism of late apartheid did not
even offer the intuitively natural trade off: auton9my but at the
cost of isolation.

Instead it enforced subordination through the

production of a structurally subordinate identity. Each organ occu
pied its natural place on a hierarchy, with whites at the top
(naturally).

2. American Apartheid?
South African apartheid was unique in its comprehensiveness,
its ruthlessness and the sophistication of its jurisdictional strategy.
Nevertheless, it is not without parallel. In the United States, terms
such as "urban poor" are almost synonymous with racial minority
groups, particularly blacks.

The "chocolate city/vanilla suburb"

pattern is dominant in the popular consciousness, if not in the in
cre asingly comple� reality of contemp orary metrop olitan
demographics. Not only is the "inner city" identified with African
Americans, but particular jurisdictions are known to be "black cit
ies": major urban centers such as Detroit, Washington, D.C., St.
Louis and Oakland, but also smaller cities such as Chelsea, Massa
chusetts and East Palo Alto, California. There are also "Asian cit
ies" such as Monterey Park, California and "Latino cities" such as
Miami, Florida.
Of course no one literally is forced into any of these jurisdic
tions. In fact, in many cases people fought hard to establish them as
minority enclaves.191 The hope was to create a safe space in which
the minority group could :flourish and enjoy autonomy. But "local
autonomy" has not served historically subordinated groups well.
Because local government autonomy is not constitutionally pro
tected, these ethnic enclaves do not provide true autonomy. For
instance, majority-black Chelsea, Massachusetts was placed into re
ceivership against the will of its residents by the Massachusetts leg
islature - its elected representatives were stripped of all but
191. See, e.g., Michael Coakley, Black Secessionists Hope Separate Means Equal, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 19, 1986, at § 1, at 5; Incorporation of Coast Town Divides Community, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1983, at A18.

February 1999]

Law's

Territory

917

ceremonial power and the affairs of the city ;were taken over by a
state administrator.192

A similar fate has befallen Washington,

D.c.193
Minority jurisdictions must bear the responsibility of autonomy
despite being denied the power the term implies. The discourse of
the organic jurisdiction in particular gives rise to the view that the
separate jurisdictions are independent, self-contained, autonomous
and therefore exclusively responsible for their condition.

The

proper relationship between organic communities is that of arms
length bargainers who owe no obligation of compassion or altruism
to each other. Ironically, while the synthetic jurisdiction seems to
promote ruthless atomism amongst individuals, the organic jurisdic
tion promotes a similarly ruthless atomism at the level of the puta
tive organic social group. Hence "local control" of public schools is
advanced as a rationale to block the desegregation of schools that
were segregated by explicit state policy194 and as a justification for
the radically unequal distribution of public funds.195 "Local respon
sibility" is invoked to forestall and fracture effective remedies to
discrimination that occurred on a regional and statewide scale.196
Within the community the ethos may be sharing, but among com
munities it is "every group for itself."
Moreover, when a jurisdiction is racially defined, racial identity
also subtly becomes jurisdictionally defined. For instance, the deci
sion of the middle class to leave economically troubled inner cities
is called "white flight." The none-too-subtle implication is that
whites are fleeing black-dominated cities and the problems that
black dominance has wrought. Not only are those blacks "left be
hind" in inner cities understood to be responsible for their condi
tion, but the condition of the black-dominated inner cities serves as
� concrete commentary on the people who live there, and by exten
sion, on all black people. The organic nature of the connection be
tween people and the jurisdiction means that the jurisdiction can be
seen as an extension of the people. 191
192. See Powers v. Secretary of Admin., 587 N.E.2d 744 (Mass. 1992) (upholding the re
ceivership of the city of Chelsea, Massachusetts)._
193. See, e.g., David A. VISe, D.C, Rescue Agreement Strips Barry's Power: White House,
Hill Leaders Settle on Plan That Puts COfltrol Board in Charge of Most of City Government,
WASH. PoST,"July 31, 1997, at Al.
194. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
195. See San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973).
196. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
197. See also G?LDBERG, supra note 186, at 198-200.
_
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This use of the organic jurisdiction was pivotal in undermining
the constitutional mandate of desegregation established in Brown v.

Board of Education.198 Less than twenty years after Brown, the
most important implications of the landmark decision were repudi
ated by the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley.199 It is no exag
geration to say that Brown's contemporary relevance is largely
symbolic.

The cultural meaning of the Brown decision is so

profound as to prevent the Court from directly overturning it, but
as effective legal precedent it has been reduced to irrelevance.
The demise of Brown v. Board of Education is a sad story,

quickly told. In

1971,

a federal district court held that Detroit's

public schools were racially segregated, in violation of the Four
teenth Amendment. The district court found that because Detroit's
entire school district was already predominantly black, "relief of
segregation in the Detroit public schools cannot to be accomplished
within the corporate geographical limits of the city. "200 Accord
ingly, the court devised a desegregation plan that included the sur
rounding suburbs of Detroit. Affirming, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that "[i]f we [were to] hold that school district
boundaries are absolute barriers to a Detroit school desegregation
plan, we would be opening a way to nullify Brown v. Board of
Education. "201
Apparently unafraid of blazing such a trail, the Supreme Court

reversed. In Milliken, the majority held that because "[t]he record

. . . contain[ed] evidence of de jure segregated conditions only in the
Detroit schools"202 only Detroit could be required to remedy the
segregation - even though it was conceded that Detroit alone
could not do so.
Significantly, Justice Stewart argued in concurrence that "the
mere fact of different racial compositions in contiguous districts
does not itself imply or constitute a violation . . . in the absence of a
showing that such disparity was imposed, fostered, or encouraged
by the State or its political subdivisions. "203 Stewart asserted that
segregation was caused by "unknown and perhaps unknowable fac
tors such as in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumula198. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
199. 418 U.S. 717, 748 (1974).
200. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
201. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 298 (6th Cir. 1973).
202. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
203. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 756 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tive acts of private racial fears."204 Leaving aside the "unknown
and the unknowable," how could the factors that Stewart actually
lists cause inter-jurisdictional racial segregation? What do they
have to do with each other?
A plausible interpretation of Stewart's factors might be as fol
lows: Black in-migration to Detroit from the southeastern United
States205 combined with higher than average black birth rates led to
a growing black population which, combined with economic decline
fueled the private racial fears of whites and led to white flight from
Detroit to its suburbs - and in some cases the creation of separate
jurisdictions which could protect themselves from the threat of
more black in-migration. In this narrative, the emergence of segre

gated jurisdictions has nothing to do with the state that created the
jurisdictions - instead, each jurisdiction is the result of private as
sociational decisions. Moreover, far from being perpetrators of seg
regation, the white suburbanites are victims, forced to flee from the
alien hordes. To make them participate in desegregation would be
like sending the Von Trapps back to Austria.
This interpretation yields a narrative of white flight from racial
persecution that has become a central concept in the racial identifi
cation of jurisdictions. It is so accepted in fact, that the Supreme
Court can take judicial notice of this innocent white flight in order

to effectively overturn the factual finding of trial courts. In Mis

souri v. Jenkins,206 the latest in a line of post Milliken cases, the
Court struck down a desegregation order that did not require move
-

ment across jurisdictional lines, but only attempted to encourage
such movement through the creation of magnet schools. The lower
court found that, because white flight from the central city schools
was a direct result of the segregative practices of Kansas City,207 the
city was obliged to remedy the resulting segregation. The Supreme
Court, however, rejected the lower court's factual :findings as "in
consistent with the typical supposition"208 that white flight is a re
sponse, not to de jure segregation, but to remedial
desegregation
'
policies.

Here I am less interested in the disposition of the case than in
the evolution of the "white flight from persecution" narrative. In
204. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
205. See generally JACKSON, supra note 148, at 150; NrCHor.As LEHMANN, THE PROMISED
LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMErucA (1994).
206. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
207. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 767 (8th Cir. 1993).
208. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 95.
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Jenkins, Justice Stewart's white flight narrative is modified; the lib

eral courts that imposed mandatory desegregation are now catalyz

ing white racial fears and white flight. In the

Jenkins narrative,

liberal courts create the jurisdictional segregation that stands as a

barrier to a legal remedy. The implication is clear - white flight is
a natural response of organic groups to state sponsored attempts to

disturb their solidarity. Further, any harm suffered by racial minor

ities isolated in impoverished inner cities is either
fault - after all, who else is around to blame? - or

(1) their own
(2) the fault of

liberal do-gooders who try to change human nature.

Nowhere in this narrative is it acknowledged that the state is

responsible for creating local governments, that local jurisdictional

formation is, as Justice Rehnquist put it in Holt, a "governmental
technique."209 To say that desegregation remedies are responsible

for white flight is to confuse a catalyst with a cause. It may be that

desegregation makes the cities less attractive to whites who, for

whatever reason, prefer segregation. But the creation of autono

mous suburbs - suburbs that, thanks to the Court's decision in

Milliken, are isolated from economic or social responsibility for the

inner cities - makes white flight possible and attractive. It is the

state that has given "fearful" whites somewhere to fly to.210

As for_ the proposition that racial segregation is "natural" one

should respond "only as natural as racism is." After all, it's no se

cret that many whites would prefer not to participate in racially in

tegrated institutions - that's why we need civil rights laws and

constitutional protections in the first place. But the white flight

narrative enshrined by the

Jenkins Court as the "typical supposi

tion is causally prepolitical.

Jenkins is premised on the belief that

tion" suggests that the human nature perpetuating racial segrega
white flight is not itself conditioned by state action.

This narrative of, white flight from persecution is deceptively

compelling on a number of levels. It resonates with a great many

historical narratives of territorial community: a crowd is formed

into a people through the collective experience of trial,' flight and
finally redemption in a new promised land.21 1 The bonds of com

munity, so lacking in the new world, are supplied by a common foe;

209. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 72 (1978).
210. My argument here is far from novel. The Court made precisely this argument when
considering the decision of a school district to divide a county wide jurisdiction into two
separate systems: one for the city and one. for the county. See Wright v. Council of Emporia,
407 U.S. 451 (1972).
211. The most obvious prototype for this narrative comes from the Judeo-Christian reli
gion, but there are several new world variants, some much less laudable, such as that classic
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the connection of a people to the soil arises, not from primordial
legacy, but out of the collective - struggle for autonomy. In other
contexts, this narrative has had justifiable, even salutary effects.
But in the context of the contemporary United States, this narrative
suggests that racial minorities are to blame for racial segregation,

an inversion of historical responsibility that would make all but the
most brash of revisionists squirm.
D.

The Interrogation of the Local

A good deal of contemporary normative social theory identifies

the greatest threat of oppression with the imposition of homogene

ity. We are told that we have a moral obligation to recognize differ
ence and to emb_race plurality and p olyphony.

B ut the

"recognition" (meaning both passive ·acknowledgement and active

affirmation; notice the two faces of this word, how it claims to ex
clude the possibility of the very value judgment it requires) of dif

ference can itself be an inquisition. "Difference" is an empty vessel
and the object of the discourse of difference can never control the
meaning of the differences that are recognized. Distinctive cultural

practices become Moynihan's "culture of poverty" with a change in

inflection; group solidarity becomes clannishness or belligerence by
moving a few commas. The forum for those who would speak truth
to power is also the interrogation chamber, the "right to be heard"
extracts a confession.

This fetishism of difference and particularity sees with one eye

closed. Although compulsory homogeneity is a threat, the other,
unglimpsed side of governmental power is the. incessant production
of difference, the creation of categories, the explosion of particular

ities, the making of the Other. To press for the recognition of dif

ference as an abstract principle is to embrace this process of
compulsory differentiation and to comply with the distancing and

social hierarchy it so often entails. The organic conception of juris

diction facilitates the production of group differences by asserting

that some territorial identities are natural and must be respected,

whatever their social consequences. It encourages us to abandon

pragmatic decisionmaking in favor of deductions from "first princi

ples" - for example, "always respect organic social groups and
their need for separation and autonomy." We should reject this
sterile paradigm and confront the moral ambiguity of difference:

example of modem cinematography and racism, D.W. Griffith's THE BIRTH OF A NATION,

supra note 171.
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differences are constructed as well as repressed, they are imposed
as well as ignored, they are chains as well as wings.

JV.

TOWARD A THEORY OF JURISDICTION

A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the
same time be the history of powers (both these terms in the plural) from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the
habitat. . . . .212
Jurisdictional boundaries help to promote and legitimate social

injustice, illegitimate hierarchy and economic inequality. This is not

to argue that jurisdictional borders are the sole cause of social injus

tice such that a different jurisdictional system would eliminate ille

gitimate hierarchy or the evils of poverty. Nor is it to argue that
promoting and legitimating inequality and social injustice are the
primary purposes or practical effects of territorial jurisdiction in
general, or of any jurisdiction in particular. It is to argue that juris

diction plays an important role in shaping our social and political

world and our social and political selves.

Group territorial identification must be understood as part of

the status quo. The concentration of social groups in formally de

fined jurisdictions is a discipline that creates a predictable and eas

ily manageable social order. Territorial identification encourages

particular types of political and interpersonal subjectivity while dis

couraging others. Therefore, we should consciously weigh the pros
and cons of territorial identification. We should ask: what aspects

of human flourishing are discouraged or excluded and, more impor

tantly, what identities and subjectivities are produced, encouraged,
sanctioned or imposed?

The recent Supreme Court decision in

structive. In

Romer v. Evans213 is in

Romer, the Court found that a Colorado ballot initia

tive that forbade the state or its subdivisions from enacting civil

rights protections for homosexuals was constitutionally invalid. But

the Court did not find that homosexuality was a constitutionally

protected classification. Nor did it overturn its earlier decision in

Bowers v. Hardwick,214 which upheld the criminalization of homo

sexual sodomy against a due process challenge. Therefore, the par
adoxical effect of Romer would seem to be that a state can outlaw

212. MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Eye of Power, in PoWERIKNOWLEDGE! SELECTED INTER·
VIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977, at 146, 149 {Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon ct
al. trans., 1980).
213. 517 U.S. 620 {1996).
214. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Bowers but must allow its localities to

protect such conduct with antidiscrimination ordinances.

Romer is subject to several interpretations, but none entirely re

solve this conceptual paradox.215 Here I will advance an interpreta
tion based on jurisdictional design. The analysis that follows is not
a proposal; I do not wish to suggest that the Court should adopt the
interpretation I am about to advance. Nor do I claim to tease out
the "true meaning" of this tortured and conflicted opinion.216 In
stead this interpretation provides a partial account of the motiva
tions that would move the Court to invalidate the initiative at issue

Romer while allowing the state to criminalize homosexual sod
Bowers intact.
Suppose the principle established in Romer is that the state may
not attempt to selectively disempower localities, in which homosex
in

omy, as it did by leaving

uals or any other statewide minority may enjoy a majority of polit
ical support, through an initiative passed at the

state level where

those locally favored minorities are overwhelmed by a hostile ma
j ority. This principle acknowledges that the state can, by selectively
extending the jurisdictional sphere, effectively deny certain minor
ity groups the ability to influence government even at the local level
where they may have majority support.
On this interpretation,

Romer is instructive because it highlights
the significance of jurisdictional architecture in creating group sta
tuses. Romer protects minority groups, but only when they concen
trate in "discrete and insular" jurisdictions. This rationale turns
215. On the one hand, without the jurisdictional distinction (state v. local law) Romer
must stand for the proposition that neither the state nor its subdivisions can foreclose the
ability of any disfavored minority (since homosexuals are not members of a protected class)
to petition government for favorable or protective laws. But it is difficult to understand how
the Constitution could deny states the power to foreclose state and local protection for con
duct that they can criminalize under Bowers. Accord Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick
Diminished, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 373, 376-81 (1997).
One could argue that Bowers allows criminalization of conduct, while Romer protects
malicious distinctions based on status, but such a status/conduct split is largely semantic: the
state could simply reword the unconstitutional law to prohibit protective legislation for ho
mosexual conduct. Then, despite the existence of laws protecting homosexual status, any
actor who wished to discriminate could claim to do so on the basis of the conduct or sus
pected conduct of the victim, rather than his or her status as homosexual. The attempt to
"take the sex out of homosexuals," as Janet Halley aptly puts it, is unlikely to succeed in
protecting them as homosexuals. See Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 429, 433 (1997) (emphasis in original).
216. This interpretation is therefore entirely unlike the many post-Romer disquisitions
which tried to "make sense" of the opinion. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and
Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203, 222 (1996) (arguing for a "clear,
strong, unbroken analytic and rhetorical thread" in Romer) ; Daniel Farber & Suzzana
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 257 (1996); Grey, supra note 215, 37576. Improving judicial opinions through (re)interpretation is certainly a noble endeavor, but
it is not mine here.
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James Madison's argument for the extended sphere217 on its head.
It, in effect, holds that any state-wide minority group has a

its victory in a

right to
local political process free of interference from a

hostile majority in the extended sphere of state politics.

Of course, it follows that the minority group has no protection

from a hostile

local majority. So held the Sixth Circuit in Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati. 218 In Equal
ity Foundation, a decision upholding a Cincinnati city charter
amendment that forbids "special rights" for homosexuals was re

manded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of

Romer. The Cincinnati charter amendment was substantially iden
tical to the amendment at issue in Romer. 219 B oth forbade civil
rights protections for homosexuals. B oth were enacted by voter ini
tiative. B oth amended the foundational document of the jurisdic

tion - the state constitution in Romer, the city charter in Equality
Foundation - and were for that reason especially difficult to re
verse through the normal political process. The primary difference
between the cases was that

Romer involved a law of statewide ap
plicability while Equality Foundation involved an initiative of local
applicability.220 On remand, the Sixth Circuit held that Romer did
not apply:

217. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
218. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
219. Amendment 2, at issue in Romer, reads:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agen·
cies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
Issue 3, the charter amendment at issue in Equality Foundation reads:
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt,
enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that ho·
mosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes,
entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or
protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the
City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or
policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition
shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 291.
220. The state versus local distinction flies in the face of decades of established law which
hold that the states may not do through their subdivisions what the constitution prohibits
them from doing directly. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of
Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) ("[A] State . . . may not avoid the strictures of
the Commerce Clause by [acting] through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the
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[Colorado Amendment 2] deprived a politically unpopular minority, .
but no others, of the political ability to obtain special legislation at
every level of state government, including within local jurisdictions
having pro-gay rights majorities . . . .

. . . [U]nlike Colorado Amendment 2, which interfered with the
expression of local community preferences in that state, the Cincin
nati Charter Amendment constituted a direct expression of the local
community will . . . . [It was] designed in part to preserve community
values and character . . . .221
In order to distinguish the anti-gay legislation at issue in Romer
and the nearly identical Cincinnati charter amendment, the Sixth
Circuit offered a paradigmatic defense of the organic local jurisdic
tion: "Unlike a state government, which is composed of discrete
and quasi-independent levels and entities such as cities, counties,
and the general state government, a municipality is a unitary local
political subdivision or unit comprised, fundamentally, of the terri
tory and residents within its geographical boundaries ."222

In this light, the Romer court needed to overrule Holt, not Bow
.
ers In Romer, a crucial issue was the difficulty of obtaining gay
friendly legislation at the state wide level. By denying gay-friendly
groups the ability to advance favorable legislation at the local level,
Amendment

2 left available only the arduous route of lobbying for

reform at the state level. The Court noted that under Amendment

2

gay citizens could "obtain specific protection against discrimina

tion only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State
Constitution. "223 Similarly in Holt, Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial ju
risdiction denied residents of the disenfranchised police jurisdiction
the possibility of local influence, leaving only the possibility of an
State itself."); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 {1973). To borrow the logic of Justice
Rehnquist in an analogous context, on the Equality Foundation rationale taken to is extreme,
the state legislature "need merely divide the State in half," passing one antigay ordinance for
the Northern half of the state and one for the Southern half. "The law would be immune
from [Romer] scrutiny simply because it was not phrased in terms of state citizenship." See
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden City v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 n.9
{1984).
221. Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 297 (emphasis added).
222. Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 298 n.9 (emphasis added). If this idea sounds fa
miliar, it should. It is more or less one idea that underlies the Voting Rights Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973 {1995). By, in some cases, mandating majority-minority electoral districts the
Act is designed to protect for racial minorities a sphere of jurisdictional influence free from
interference by hostile majorities at the state level. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973{c). The difference
between Romer and the Voting Rights Act in this regard is that the Act envisions a conscious
political process for designing electoral districts, while Romer treats jurisdictional boundaries
as given. Therefore the Act seeks to alter the jurisdictional boundaries themselves, while
Romer only protects the local majorities that happen to emerge.
223. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
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arduous statewide campaign for reform. In both Romer and Holt
the complaint was that a select group of citizens was denied the
ability to influence government at the local level while others were
able to do so. And in both cases the response was that the group
was on equal footing with all other citizens at the level of state
government.
The jurisdictional architecture at issue in Romer and Equality
Foundation illustrates several points. One point is fairly obvious
but often overlooked: territorial identification cuts both ways. Lo
cal autonomy may protect gay rights ordinances in Aspen and Den
ver, but it would also allow antigay laws in more conservative
jurisdictions such as Cincinnati. At best, we have a normative prin
ciple of compulsory provincialism:224 minority sub groups can ex
pect favorable treatment only when they accept social isolation and
only within the boundaries of "their" jurisdiction. In the broader
public culture, social assimilation is required (don't ask, don't tell).
The social landscape this anticipates is one of fragmented, even
antagonistic quasi-autonomous jurisdictions. Each political terri
tory becomes both a haven and a prison for its residents. As in the
medieval walled city, freedom within the friendly city's walls yields
to tyranny outside thdse walls. Just as the medieval serf who lived
outside the city was subject to the whip of the feudal lord or the law
of the highwayman, so too the homosexual who lives in a hostile
local environment has no defense against local prejudice. Compul
sory provincialism forces marginal sub groups into a limited
number of well identified enclaves. Those who refuse to or cannot
retreat to these "safe havens" are understood to have accepted
their fate on the outside.
This is the best we can expect from territorial autonomy. But
even this impoverished autonomy is far from certain. For what
counts as respect for local difference from one perspective is the
disproportionate power of a faction from another. For instance, in

Romer Justice Scalia puts Madison back on his feet, complaining in
dissent:

[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposa
ble income, and, of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much
more ardently than the public at large, they possess political power
much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide. . . .

224. See Ford, Geography and Sovereignty, supra note 150, at 1401-07, 1417-18 (describ·
ing the emergence of a judicially enforced territorial provincialism).
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. . . [Amendment 2] sought to counter both the geographic concen
tration and the disproportionate political power of homosexuals .
.
It put directly, to all the citizens of the State, the question: Should
homosexuality be given special protection? They answered no.225
.

.

Local difference is easily recast as factionalism and the courts
toggle back and forth between the two perspectives. Sometimes lo
cal decisions are lauded because they supposedly reflect an organic
lifestyle deserving of respect. At other times local decisions are
denigrated as the result of the disproportionate and concentrated
influence of a faction. Territorial identification thus provides no
guarantee of autonomy, no safe haven from outside influence. It
can just as easily facilitate stereotyping and targeting an unpopular
group.
Finally, jurisdiction is not a neutral slate on which a preexisting
and authentic identity can be inscribed. The choice to adopt a terri
torial self definition necessarily alters the nature of the self that is
so defined.226 Scalia understands homosexual identity as an urban
and elite identity, a sort of decadent, sybaritic indulgence of the
effete upper classes.227 My suggestion is that many homosexuals
are pushed into - and are complicit in - such an identification by
the compulsory provincialism that the

majority in Romer offers.

Justice Scalia may play the harp but Justice Kennedy, the author of
the majority opinion, called the tune. The problem here is not sim
ply that homosexuals who don't fit the model are denied protection
of any kind. What about rural homosexuals or those in smaller sub
urbs? The problem is also that those urban, well-to-do homosexu
als whom

Romer ostensibly protects are forced into a fairly narrow

range of identities.228 This is not to say that their authentic selves
are being repressed but instead that their authentic selves - at any
225. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal cita
tions omitted). Another example of the view that minority controlled jurisdictions are illegit
imate factions is found in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1990), a decision
that implicitly described minority controlled cities as factions that required constitutional
surveillance against "reverse discrimination" and in-group political patronage.
226. See Ford, Geography and Sovereignty, supra note 150, at 1416-17 (observing that
identity formation will be affected by territorial arrangements).
227. Scalia chides: "When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with
the knights rather than the villeins - and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the
views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's members are drawn." Romer,
517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Accord K. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in COLOR
C0Nsc10us 30, 99 (K. Appiah & Amy Gutmann eds., 1996) ("What demanding respect for
people as blacks or as gays requires is that there be some scripts that go with being an Afri
can-American or having same sex desires. There will be proper ways of being black and gay
. . . It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy seriously will want to ask whether
we have not replaced one type of tyranny with another."). My point here is simply that
group-identified jurisdictions help to map out such compulsory scripts.
.

Michigan Law Review

928

[Vol. 97:843

rate the only selves they're going to get - are being

built in part by

this process of concentration and territorial identification.

We should ask whether the identities and territories produced

through compulsory territorialism are the type of identities that can
contribute to a healthy and just society.

We should also ask

whether such identities contribute to the human flourishing of those

who, however freely or unwillingly, adopt them. Finally, we should

ask, along with Anthony Appiah, whether these are identities that

we will want to live with in the long run.229 Because I fear the an

swer to these questions is no, I believe we should reject territorial

provincialism and begin designing the legal and social geographies
of the future.230

We are building the jurisdictions of the future today. A self

conscious theory of territorial jurisdiction - which would also be a

theory of the spatial organization of the political, the economic and
the social - would better allow us to do so. A theory of jurisdic

tion would draw on a wide range of sources: the analysis developed

by James Madison and the American federalists, the judicial opin

ions involving the commerce clause and the privileges and immuni

ties clause of the Constitution, the field of international law, the

study of urban development and the built environment (including

urban planning and architecture), and recent developments in the
study of the spatiality of social institutions231 and everyday life.232

A theory of jurisdiction might be developed in law schools, plan

ning departments, schools of government and policy, departments

of political philosophy and schools of design and architecture. The

site of such study is less important that the recognition that it is

badly needed. A failure to study the politics and legalities of space
is a failure to map law's territory.

V.

CONCLUSION: FEAR AND LOATHING IN THE JURISDICTION
OF THE FUTURE

Already the Great Khan was leafing through his atlas, over the
maps of cities that menace in nightmares and maledictions: Enoch,
Babylon, Yahooland, Butua, Brave New World.
229. See id.
230. I hope it is clear that this discussion applies to many social groups, not just homosex
uals. I use Romer because so many have (in my view mistakenly) hailed the decision as a
victory for gay rights. Romer may well be part of an unarticulated governmental project of
territorial sorting - one that I fear will not end well for any of the groups so sorted.
231. See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 173; EDWARD W. So1A, Pos1MODERN GEOGRAPHIES:
THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989).
232. See, e.g., MICHEL DECERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (1984).
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He said: "It is all useless, if the last landing plactq .can only be the
infernal city, and it is there that, in ever-narrowing circles, the current
is drawing us."
And Polo said: "The inferno of the living is not something that
will be; if there is one, it is what is already here, the inferno we live
every day, that we form by being together. There are two ways to
escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and
become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is
risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and
learn to recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not
inferno, then make them endure, give them space."233
So is jurisdiction something to be feared, loathed, condemned?
Is it the product of some sinister plot, born of medieval tyrants,
developed by mercurial mercantilists, refined in the academies of

empires, and finally perfected behind the closed doors of the mili

tary and in the high towers of Capital (and who is to say these two
aren't joined, by interest, by structure, by subterranean tunnels
reaching deep into the bowels of the earth, "like wormes in the en
trayles of a naturall man)?"234
This would make for interesting reading, no doubt. But the
story I have offered, though not as dramatic, is, I hope, as fascinat
ing in its own way. What I have argued is that territorial jurisdic
tion -

something

that

seems

timeless,

natur?I

and

indeed

inevitable - is in fact an invention, an invention as essential to the
development of the modem world as the tungsten filament.
Territorial jurisdiction is nothing less than the map of the law's
interaction with society.

It embodies the deepest tensions and con

flicts in our aspirations for human civilization. If territorial jurisdic
tion seems inevitable, it is because the aspirations and fears it
embodies are inevitable. The organic jurisdiction vindicates our as
piration for community, social harmony, oedipal completion, the
nostalgia of the whole and the one. Yet it also evokes our terror at
suffocation, the destruction of the unique ego, totalitarianism. The
spirit of community threatens to become the mentality of the mob;
group culture bleeds into the groupthink of the cult. The synthetic
jurisdiction is the child of our desire for mastery of an alien world,
for order, rationality, utility, the universal. Yet it also conjures the
horror of alienation, isolation, the ghostless controlling machine, a
bloodless world in which interpersonal connection is limited to the
arms-length bargain, in which the only meaning is the agnostic logic
233. CALVINO, supra note 183, at 164-65.
234. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 375 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
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of exchange.

Little wonder then that we oscillate between ex

tremes, each of which is equivalent to our most passionate desire
and our deepest phobias.235 "Institutional fetishism" is literally ac
curate to describe our relationship to jurisdiction.
This conflict is intractable, at least in the terms in which our
contemporary institutions force it upon us. And so I fear that I
must violate your expectations that we

will

end \vith some hopeful

prediction, better yet some prescription that will help us to over
come the difficulties that this Article has described, like the hero
that arrives in the nick of time. Instead, the approach this Article
suggests is pragmatic, but pragmatic in the tragic, continental tone
rather than the more familiar optimistic tone of the Americans
James, Pierce and Dewey. The conflicts that haunt legal analysis in
general and our understanding of jurisdiction in particular may re
sist logical resolution. The faith that reform or even revolution can
resolve these contradictions - unifying the severed psyche and
banishing alienation - may only deliver us all the more quickly
into their grasp. We may be doomed to reproduce the same ten
sions in different form, over and over again. The meaning of his
tory may not be the heroic story of progress and perfection, nor the
epic of decline, rebirth and redemption, but the blank tragedy of
meaningless repetition.

It

is this realization that demands constant vigilance, with no

guarantee of safety, that demands we make the effort and take the
risk to find and nurture that which may be more noble than it is
familiar. The history of space and spaces offers a rogues' gallery of
cartographers, imperialists, merchant adventurers, medieval rulers,
town constables, urban visionaries, architects, judges and jurists.
But in all of these there are only protagonists, no heroes. The he
roes and heroines, perhaps, are yet to come.

235. See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L.
(1979).
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